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Few systems operate completely independent of humans.  Thus any study of system 
risk or reliability requires analysis of the potential for failure arising from human 
activities in operating and managing this.  Human reliability analysis (HRA) grew up in 
the 1960s with the intention of modelling the likelihood and consequences of human 
error. Initially, it treated the humans as any other component in the system.  They 
could fail and the consequences of their failure were examined by tracing the effects 
through a fault tree.  Thus to conduct a HRA one had to assess the probability of 
various operator errors, be they errors of omission or commission.  First generation 
HRA may have used some sophistication in accomplishing this, but in essence that is 
all they did.  Over the years, methods have been developed that recognise human 
potential to recover from a failure, on the one hand, and the effects of stress and 
organisational culture on the likelihood of possible errors, on the other.  But no method 
has yet been developed which incorporates all our understanding of individual, team 
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This report was produced by the Rethinking Human Reliability Analysis Methodologies 
project funded by the UK Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council under 
contract:  EP/E017800/1.  The contract was led by Manchester Business School, the 
University of Manchester and involved Cranfield University, the Universities of  
Kingston, Lancaster, Nottingham, Strathclyde and the University of Wales, Swansea. 
The project aimed to: 
• survey a range of relevant literatures to identify knowledge, theories and models that 
should be incorporated into an updated human reliability analysis (HRA) 
methodology; 
• explore several case studies to identify some of the interactions between people, 
organisations, management and cultures that led to ‘human error’ in the broadest of 
senses; 
• explore recent suggestions for enhancing HRA by the inclusion of some of the 
qualitative understandings of the contexts and mechanisms that affect human error; 
• identify required elements for an enhanced quantitative methodology for HRA. 
In addition to this report the project also produced the following papers: 
• T. Bedford and C Bayley (2008) ‘Sensitivity analysis and the CREAM method for 
Human Reliability’ Department of Management Science, University of Strathclyde, 
Glasgow, G1 1QE. 
• S. Wu and S. J. T. Pollard (2008)  ‘Human reliability analysis has a role in preventing 
drinking water incidents’ School of Applied Science, Cranfield University, Cranfield, 
MK43 0AL. 
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Human Reliability Analysis: 
A Review and Critique 
Final report of the EPSRC funded project  
Rethinking Human Reliability Analysis Methodologies  
 
Sondipon Adhikari1, Clare Bayley2, Tim Bedford3, Jerry Busby4, Andrew Cliffe5, 
Geeta Devgun, Moetaz Eid, Simon French6, Ritesh Keshvala, Simon Pollard7, 
Emma Soane8, David Tracy, and Shaomin Wu  
Abstract 
Few systems operate completely independent of humans.  Thus any study of system risk 
or reliability requires analysis of the potential for failure arising from human activities in 
operating and managing this.  Human reliability analysis (HRA) grew up in the 1960s 
with the intention of modelling the likelihood and consequences of human error. Initially, 
it treated the humans as any other component in the system.  They could fail and the 
consequences of their failure were examined by tracing the effects through a fault tree.  
Thus to conduct a HRA one had to assess the probability of various operator errors, be 
they errors of omission or commission.  First generation HRA may have used some 
sophistication in accomplishing this, but in essence that is all they did.  Over the years, 
methods have been developed that recognise human potential to recover from a failure, 
on the one hand, and the effects of stress and organisational culture on the likelihood of 
possible errors, on the other.  But no method has yet been developed which incorporates 
all our understanding of individual, team and organisational behaviour into overall 
assessments of system risk or reliability. 
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In this report we explore these issues, surveying briefly both the HRA literature and 
related literatures on behavioural and organisational theories. We conclude that: 
(i) no single HRA method is likely to suitable for all purposes and contexts;  
(ii) the range of theoretical bases for modelling human reliability needs to be 
extended to take account of, e.g., more recent understandings of human cognition 
and behaviour as well as organisational effects on performance; 
(iii) much more comparative research is needed on the coherence, strengths and 
weaknesses of different HRA methods proposed to date.   
Only then will we be able to build comprehensive system risk and reliability analyses in 
which a reasonable degree of trust may be placed. 
Keywords: Cynefin categorisation of tasks; normative and summative risk and 
reliability analyses; high reliability organisations; human reliability 
analysis (HRA); Swiss cheese model.  
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1 Introduction 
Reliability analysis [1, 2] and risk analysis [3-5] are two subjects with a great deal of 
overlap: the former tending to deal with systems subject to repeated failures and the need 
for maintenance policies to address these; the latter tending to deal with more 
catastrophic one-off failures that may write-off a system with concomitant impacts 
elsewhere.  But both essentially are concerned with anticipating possible failures and 
assessing their likelihood.  Human reliability analysis (HRA)9 relates to methodologies for 
anticipating and assessing the effect of those failures which relate to human action or 
inaction, and not the failure of some physical component.  It should be noted that human 
error is a major contributor to the risks and reliability of many systems: over 90% in the 
nuclear industry [6], over 80% in the chemical and petro-chemical industries [7], over 
75% of marine casualties [8] and over 70% of aviation accidents [9]; see also Hollnagel 
[10].  A survey of failures in drinking water distribution undertaken as part of this project 
examined 61 cases, and found that of 172 distinct error conditions, 39 (23%) arose from 
physical or environmental causes, 65 (38%) from human error, 62 (36%) from latent 
design errors and 6 (3%)from consumer or third party failings [11]. Thus HRA is an 
essential part of any wider risk or reliability analysis. 
In this paper we survey the current state of HRA, arguing that it is ill-suited for the needs 
of contemporary society and business.  The growth of service industries with new 
business models implies a greater dependence of economies on reliable human 
interactions.  For instance, recently human checks and balances failed to detect some 
dubious investment behaviour of a trader at Société Générale and led to a loss of some 
€4.9bn, large enough to have economic and financial effects beyond the bank.  The 
current ‘credit crunch’ owes not a little to misjudgement and error in the banking and 
finance industries, indicating the growing interdependence of many disparate parts of the 
modern global economy and implying a yet wider requirement for HRA [12, 13].   
We make our case that current practices in and uses of HRA are not fit for the 
complexities of modern society on a number of grounds. 
• Historically HRA methodologies have treated the failings of humans in systems in a 
manner similar to those of physical components.  So-called second and third 
generation methodologies have tried to recognise the difference between human 
failure and physical breakdown.  However, their success is at best partial. 
• The widely quoted Swiss Cheese Model (see below), which offers a qualitative 
understanding of system failure, fails to recognise many interactions and correlations 
between human errors and the operational environment. It emphasises a reductionist 
approach to HRA and may thus ‘wrong-foot’ the users of reliability analysis 
methodologies leading them to miss some of the key factors and mechanisms that 
should be built into their models; and, perhaps, put too much trust in the combined 
effect of several safety barriers. 
• Human behaviour is complex and often counter intuitive.  For instance, it seems 
sensible to use modern technological advances to make the physical components of a 
                                                 
9  A list of abbreviations is given in Appendix A. 
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system safer.  But there is some evidence that making subsystems safer could make 
the overall system less safe because of the propensity of humans to take less care 
personally when a system takes more care [10, 14].  High reliability organisational 
design in part uses teams to check and double check each others’ activities, but again 
there are cases in which each falsely assumed that the others had checked something. 
• The very concepts of human error and reliability are misleading. Human errors and 
faults are socially defined events: a perfectly reasonable action to one person may be 
an unreasonable failure to another [15]. Furthermore, however well judged a decision 
may be a priori, it may through ‘ill fortune’ lead to unwanted outcomes. Hence what 
may seem an error in hindsight may not be the outcome of irrational or erroneous 
choices. We should focus more on human behaviour as individuals, groups and 
organisations and recognise its potential involvement in system failure – without the 
pejorative judgement of whether that behaviour is aberrant in any sense. 
• The roles of risk and reliability analysis in general and of HRA in particular, are often 
misunderstood by system designers, managers and regulators.  In a sense they believe 
in the models too much and fail to recognise the potential for unmodelled behaviours 
– physical or human – to lead to overall system breakdown: cf [16].  There are two 
ways in which HRA may be used.   
− When HRA is incorporated into a summative analysis, its role is to help estimate 
the overall failure probabilities in order to support decisions on, e.g., adoption, 
licensing or maintenance.  Overconfidence in the models leads to overconfidence 
in the estimated probabilities and possible poor appreciation of the overall risks.   
− There are also formative uses of HRA in which recognising and roughly ranking 
the potential for human error can help improve the design of the system itself and 
also the organisational structures and processes by which it is managed.  Effective 
HRA not only complements sound technical risk analysis of the physical systems, 
but also helps organisations develop their safety culture and manage their overall 
risk.  Indeed, arguably it is through this that HRA achieves its greatest effect. 
• Existing HRA models have been developed (primarily in the nuclear industry) for use 
in assessing operator deviations from nominal operating modes.  However, a more 
holistic view of the impact of humans requires a wider modelling framework which 
accounts for differing human roles in the system from the strategic to the operational.  
Design flaws introduce further risks to the system that arise from limitations inherent 
in human foresight. Thus it may be the case that no single HRA methodology is 
appropriate to all contexts and all parts of a full system risk analysis; and thus there 
may be a need to draw on several methodologies in analysing the system.  
Few of our comments are new: several have their origins more than a quarter century ago. 
But to a large extent they point to issues that remain to be circumvented and ones that are 
often ill-appreciated outside professional risk and reliability communities.  NUREG-
1792: Good Practices for Implementing Human Reliability Analysis [17] has made 
several of the points made here, although we would claim that our critique is more 
fundamental in nature.  We do not believe that adopting current best practice will address 
the most serious of issues that concern us. 
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We begin in Section 2 with a brief review of the development of HRA methodologies 
from the 1960s to the present day.  In doing so we offer a discussion of the so-called first, 
second, and emerging third generation HRA methodologies, categorising these not so 
much chronologically as by their characteristics in terms of their underlying concepts, 
models and applicability.  While we recognise that these methodologies have sought to 
incorporate more sophisticated understandings of human behaviour, we believe that they 
are still lacking, given the many developments that have occurred in, inter alia, 
behavioural, cognitive and organisational sciences.  To support this belief we offer a 
review of such developments in Section 3.  In Section 4 we discuss several case studies, 
reflecting on them in the light of the developments discussed in Section 3 and seeking to 
draw out lessons to shape the development of HRA.  In Section 5 we discuss a number of 
contextual issues relating both to the tasks being under taken in the system under study 
and the purpose of the risk or reliability analysis itself.  Our conclusion is that there are a 
plethora of issues to be taken account of in modelling and analysing human behaviour.  
Given this, we argue in Section 6 that we may need to draw on several HRA 
methodologies within a single overall system risk or reliability analysis, at each point 
choosing an appropriate HRA method for the specifics of the particular context.  However, 
we also recognise that we may not have sufficient comparative data on current HRA 
methodologies to be able to delineate clearly the circumstances for which each is 
appropriate.  Thus we outline a route-map for future R&D to build this portfolio 
methodology.  We draw together the threads of our argument in Section 7.   
Before beginning we should remark further on the language of error and failure.  Perhaps 
for reasons of history and culture, it is common to talk of the failings and errors of others, 
to seek to attribute blame to some and exonerate others.  But to do so may miss much.  
As noted above, we shall argue that it is more helpful to talk about behaviours without 
any negative attribution of failing or error.  Moreover, we should talk of the behaviours 
of groups, teams and organisations as much as of human operators.  System failure may 
arise from perfectly reasonable behaviours and interactions of any of these.  Thus later in 
the paper we shall move away from the language of human error and failure.  However, 
in the early sections in which we review previous and current perspectives, we use the 
somewhat pejorative language of error still found in much of the literature. 
2 The development of quantitative HRA 
2.1 Introduction 
HRA has its roots in the early probabilistic risk assessments performed as part of the US 
nuclear energy development programme in the 1960s [4, 18].  Early first generation HRA 
methods were very similar to those in other areas of reliability analysis: namely, the 
probability of a human error is assessed via a simple fault (or event) tree analysis.  The 
fault tree simply listed an initiating event, which might be an indication of a system error 
reaching the human operator or an intention on the part of the operator to perform an 
action, and then considered a series of subsequent events which could lead to the ultimate 
success or failure of the operator in achieving his/her goal.  Essentially, the human 
operator is treated as a component in the system much as any other component such as a 
microchip or load-bearing structural element.  Hollnagel [10] refers to this general 
approach as decomposition.  Operators failing to respond to events were termed errors of 
omission, while unintended human actions were labelled errors of commission.   
S. French - 8 - 19/1/2010 
Human Reliability Analysis 
8
However, such a simplistic dichotomy flies in 
the face of current qualitative understandings 
of human cognition, motivation and decision 
making, including the effects of stress, 
emotion, training, group interactions, 
organisational structures, cultures and so 
forth. Research in these fields has shown that 
there are systematic influences on decision 
making and behaviour that cannot be 
categorised as simply as omissions or 
commissions.  Human failure is far more 
complex than the failure of, say, a steel support beam or a hard disk. We return to this 
issue in Section 3. 
 
Figure 1 Reason's Swiss Cheese model 
[19] 
Reason [19] likened system failure involving human error to slices of Swiss cheese: see 
Figure 1.  Essentially this suggests that systems do not fail because of a single failure, but 
because several elements fail near simultaneously, as if the holes in slices of Swiss 
cheese have aligned.  In a way the Swiss Cheese model itself is too mechanistic: one is 
led to imagine a fixed number of slices, sliding backwards and forwards relative to each 
other until a series of holes align.   
In safety studies one talks of the number of safety barriers or layers between normal 
operation and system failure; and, in a sense, the Swiss Cheese model picks up on this.  
Systems are designed with a set number of safety barriers and these barriers are intended 
to be independent.  But human behaviour can correlate the risks of failure of two or more 
barriers.  Their behaviour and propensity to failure varies in complex ways with, e.g., 
their tiredness, stress and general emotional state, which may well be influenced by 
external events leading to a common cause which may disrupt several safety barriers 
simultaneously.  For instance, the Chernobyl Accident (Section 4.1) was in large measure 
caused by the imperative to conduct an engineering experiment within a fixed time, 
leading to stress in the operators and behaviour that effectively compromised some of the 
safety barriers together.  Another potential unsafe behaviour is to discover an indication 
of a ‘hole’ in one layer and to defer further investigation, relying on the ‘cover’ offered 
by other layers: such behaviour lay at the heart of a system failure in the Sellafield case 
study (Section 4.1).  On the positive side, humans have the ability to recover, to respond 
to the unexpected, to think ‘out of the box’, and so on, effectively repairing a 
compromised layer or even introducing a new one.  In terms of the Swiss Cheese model, 
many of these failings correspond to varying the size of the holes, perhaps in a correlated 
fashion and maybe varying the number of layers over time.  Wu and Pollard [11] suggest 
an extra layer representing consumers and third parties is needed to understand water 
industry failure.  Reason himself discusses similar criticisms [20]; but the simpler 
mechanistic thinking implicit in Figure 1 still pervades thinking in much of reliability 
engineering.   
During the 1990s many of these issues raised by Reason [19, 21] and others (e.g. Janis 
[22], Perrow [13], Roberts [23], Weick [24]) led to calls to revise HRA methodologies and 
adopt more sophisticated models and understandings of human error.  Thus recent, 
second generation methodologies have attempted to develop a more sophisticated 
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approach to human reliability, particularly the ability of humans to recover and prevent 
some or all the consequences of the threat of impending system failure.  Note that the 
term second generation was coined by Doughty [25]. Emerging third generation 
methodologies go further modelling a range of behaviours in to recover and avert failure.  
However, we should note that one can easily be led into categorising HRA methods 
according to the chronology of their first development.  It is perhaps better to characterise 
the different methodologies according to their characteristics, as we do below. 
Summaries of several different HRA methodologies may be found Appendix B; see also 
[10, 26-28].  We recognise that our selection is somewhat UK/European centric: it is 
where our experience lies. However, we do not believe that this rather partial selection 
invalidates any of the general points that we make in this report. We close this section 
with a brief generic summary of the main stages of HRA, recognising that particular 
methods may omit some of these and include others. 
Stages in an HRA. 
1. Examine the system in detail, perhaps through a plant visit if it exists already or by a 
careful study of the plans and design. 
2. Review information from any risk analyses of the physical system and, in particular, 
any fault trees. 
3. Talk through and brainstorm where any human activity or inactivity may lead to a 
potential system failure. 
4. Detail the tasks and activities in which the humans are involved and which may lead 
through omission, commission or deliberate intervention to system failure, building 
an HRA fault tree to explore the interactions that lead to failure.  When focusing on 
operator error, stages 3 and 4 are referred to as a task analysis. 
5. Assign human error probabilities (HEPs) to the fault tree.  These are essentially the 
probabilities that the human activity cause specific branches in the HRA fault tree to 
be taken.  They may be derived from tables collated from observations or from expert 
judgement. 
6. Modify the HEPs by applying performance shaping factors (PSFs) which seek to allow 
for the moderating effects of stress, tiredness or similar.   
7. Assess and allow for any probabilistic dependence and correlations between the 
human activities.  This is almost inevitably a matter for expert judgement. 
8. Use the HRA fault trees, HEPs, PSFs and assessed correlations to calculate the overall 
system failure probabilities. 
9. Consider potential recovery actions and repeat stages 3 – 8 above on these, using the 
result to modify the overall system failure probabilities. 
10. Conduct sensitivity analyses on all the calculations and use these to inform the 
systems designers and risk managers of the potential for failure arising from human 
activities.  
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Some ‘first’ generation methods had a quite sophisticated approach to human reliability, 
perhaps more so than some ‘second’ generation ones.  Here we review a range of 
methodologies according to their characteristics.  As Boring [29] has noted, chronology is 
not a good guide to whether a method is considered first, second or third generation. 
Context and cognition are the two features that second generation methods are supposed 
to contain – yet context is certainly modelled to some extent in first generation methods. 
Third generation methods contain more dynamic simulation, and have to be implemented 
on a computer.   
The classification into different generations of methods is a sign of a need to classify and 
categorize the whole family of approaches that have been developed. Unfortunately there 
is little clarity about why different models have been developed, and why the specific 
modelling choices have been made, Furthermore, we really need to categorize not only 
the type of situation being modelled, but the purpose of the model, the end user of the 
model, the resources required etc. We are some way from having such a framework, 
although we return to this topic later in the paper.  
In order to make a start towards such a holistic classification, we begin by describing 
some of the features of important methods. The table below considers a number of 
features: 
• Task analysis: is the method based on a preliminary task analysis? 
• Dependencies: are we able to model statistical or other kinds of dependencies 
between different events? 
• Performance shaping factors (PSF): these are typically used to describe aspects of the 
environment in which the human is acting. We describe if and how such PSFs are 
included in the model. 
• Decomposition: this describes how the method breaks down a collection of actions 
comprising a task. 
• Time effects: these describe how time can be incorporated into the model, for example 
when there is a time given to complete a task. 
• Error classification: this indicates whether there is a classification scheme used that 
would direct the user to apply the method differently depending on the class of error 
identified. 
• Expert opinion required: this indicates in what ways the analyst is required to be a 
source of data or make judgements, or (where only limited judgement is required), 
how much the method guides the analyst. 
• Calibration: this covers the extent to which the model outputs have been or are 
calibrated to ensure numerical accuracy.   
• Uncertainty in outputs: does the output give point values only or does it also include 
an assessment of a range of credible values? 
S. French - 11 - 19/1/2010 
Human Reliability Analysis 
1
S. French 
Human Reliability Analysis 
- 12 - 19/1/2010 2
• Sensitivity analysis: is there a clearly developed sensitivity analysis procedure for the 
model? 
• Context modelling: in what ways is the context of the human activity modelled within 
the method? 
• Operator control modes: does the model allow for a range of different types of 













THERP Assumed Special dependency method 
used to couple probabilities 
in event sequence, but this is 
numerical adjustment rather 
than true dependency model 
Yes, used to 
modify nominal 
HEPs 
ET used to present 








SLIM Assumed Not explicitly modelled. 
Implicit modelling through 
PSFs 
Yes, used to score 
impact on situation 
Not in method No No Highly driven by 
EJ 
HEART Assumed Not explicitly modelled. 
Implicit modelling through 
PSFs 
Yes, but called 
EPCs which are 
used to modify 
generic HEPs 
ET suggested as 
method by which 
calculations for 
different HEART 




time is an EPC 
Generic tasks detail 
level of complexity 






HCR Assumed No explicitly modelled. 
Implicit modelling through 
PSFs 
Yes, used to 
influence median 
time required for 
task 
Models time to 
task completion 






ATHEANA Assumed  Yes, but called 
EFCs  
    
CREAM Assumed Scoring includes dependency 
through adjustment of CPC 
scores for dependent CPCs in 
the basic method. 
Probabilistic dependency 
implicit through CPCs 
Yes, but called 
CPCs  








are related to 
time available, 
and available 










CPCs and generic 
failure types.  
Table 1    Characteristics of Different HRA methodologies 
(Abbreviations are listed in Appendix A) 
 
S. French - 13 - 19/1/2010 
Human Reliability Analysis 
- 14 - 19/1/2010 
Method calibration Uncertainty in outputs Sensitivity 
analysis 
Context modelling Operator control 
modes 
THERP      
SLIM Calibrated by two 
"known" HEPs 
No No Context rating of task on 
PSF scale and PSF weight 
No 
HEART Error bands calibrated 
to published studies 
Uncertainty bands 
included, with method 
for propagating 
No Context through task 
analysis and EPCs 
No 
HCR Calibrated to simulator 
tests ? 
    
ATHEANA      
CREAM Control modes in basic 
model, and basic failure 
probabilities in 
extended model judged 
to be similar to other 
HRA methods 
Uncertainty ranges for 
outputs of basic and 
extended models 
No Context through task 
analysis and CPCs 
Defines different 
control modes, but 
these are model outputs 
rather than inputs 
Table 2  Characteristics of Different HRA methodologies (continued) 
(Abbreviations are listed in Appendix A) 
S. French 




3 A review of relevant developments in behavioural, cognitive, 
management and organisational sciences 
3.1 Relevant developments in behavioural and cognitive science 
3.1.1 Introduction 
Approaches to modelling errors and biases in human and organisational decision making 
tend to categorized human error into three groups. 
1. Systematic errors related to individuals, e.g. biases in information processing, 
information overload, fatigue. 
2. Systematic errors related to organisational systems or structures, e.g. ineffective 
communication structures within and across organisational hierarchies. 
3. Random errors of people or organisational systems which are difficult to predict or 
quantify. 
As indicated above, we are concerned that such categorisations use somewhat pejorative 
terminology.  More important, perhaps, is a concern that the categorisation misses some 
important issues that influence human reliability.  In the next section we discuss an 
alternative approach to the conceptualization and modelling of human behaviour in 
organisations. 
3.1.2 Modelling error 
We consider decision making and behaviour in a broad sense rather than focusing in on 
error.   Understanding errors requires a more holistic approach to understanding decision 
making behaviour for three reasons. 
First, the error focus on HRA models may be too narrow [26, 30]. Error behaviours are a 
subset of individual behaviours. To consider error alone might be to commit a type II 
error on our part.  Errors are just one of a range of behavioural products of a number of 
individual and organisational precursors. Errors are not a class of behaviours that are 
entirely distinct from other behaviours and should not be considered in isolation. In the 
organisational context, it is often an external system or judgement that categorises a 
behaviour as an error rather than the behaviour itself being inherently and indisputably 
wrong.  
Second, models of HRA that include people factors typically focus on cognitive aspects of 
decision making, such as the ATHEANA model. Recent developments in the modelling of 
decision making emphasise the dual influences of cognition and emotion on decision 
outcomes [31]; Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee and Welch’s model of decision making is one 
such example [32].  The addition of emotions to cognitive models of decision making is 
highly relevant to safety critical industries since the consequences of accidents are 
frightening as well as costly.  Furthermore, work roles and the interpersonal nature of 
work have emotional antecedents and consequences.  
Third, the use of high reliability systems designed and engineering to minimize errors and 
hazards has both benefits and disadvantages. It is of course important that systems are 
designed to be as safe as possible. However, the reliance on such systems can cause 
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biases and flaws in decision making. A high profile example is the leak in the THORP 
plant at Sellafield (Thermal Oxide Reprocessing Plant) that was discovered in 2005: see 
Section 4.1 below. This relatively modern plant had been designed to a high standard of 
safety. Information that indicated a system problem was available for some months and 
yet went unnoticed. Despite previous incidents in 1998 and earlier in 2005, the 
information that should have suggested a leak, or at least a problem requiring 
investigation, was misinterpreted. The prevailing attitude was one of an error-free system 
and information that could suggest the contrary was ignored or dismissed. This type of 
decision making behaviour has well researched in other contexts for some years: see, e.g. 
Janis & Mann, [33]. An effective system, therefore, should be both safe and yet not 
perceived as error proof.  
3.1.3 A holistic approach to decision making 
In view of the above reasons why it is relevant to take a more holistic view of decision 
making, we propose an alternative to the current HRA approach to error modelling that 
draws upon the concept of self-regulation.  A self-regulatory approach to decision 
making behaviour has its roots in three related areas of psychology: risk, individual self-
regulation, and models that incorporate the concept of optimal levels of functioning. 
One approach to modelling risk is the risk thermostat model [10, 14]. Adams [34] 
proposed that there is a dynamic interaction between actors’ perceptions and behaviours, 
and their environment. The Adams model proposes that the interaction between risk 
propensity, perceptions of societal risk, perceived danger, and positive and negative 
outcome expectancies influence risk behaviour such that people will adjust their 
behaviour to be more or less risky, as appropriate for their preferences and their situation. 
For example, Adams claimed that improvements in road safety and car design have led to 
greater risk taking in driving. 
Individual self-regulation is defined as the internal and behavioural adjustments that 
function to maintain factors such as cognitions, emotions and performance within 
acceptable limits [35]. This approach to modelling behaviour proposed that behaviour is 
goal orientated and there are internal, hierarchical processes that enable people to put 
thoughts into actions [36] through activation and inhibition of decision making processes. 
Some of the decision processes take place at a subconscious level and never reach 
conscious deliberation, a process called automaticity [37]. Thus, like safety critical 
organisations, there is a dynamic interaction between people and their environment that is 
designed for effective behaviour.  
Models of decision making and behaviour that incorporate optimal levels of functioning 
have a long history and a range of organisational applications. For example, Yerkes and 
Dodson published their inverted U model of the association between performance and 
arousal in the early 20th century.  More recent models of work performance show similar 
patterns: some effort and pressure can be effective, too much of both leads to burnout 
[38].  
The literature on decision making heuristics and biases is also relevant [31, 39, 40]. 
Numerous studies have demonstrated the existence of systematic and robust cognitive 
biases, and are well summarized by Bazerman [41]. For example, emotionally-laden or 
otherwise individual salient information is recalled easily and likely to be considered as 
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significant to a decision when more objective evidences shows that other types of 
information are more important to a decision. The case of the Sellafield operators and 
managers dismissing information about a leak in the plant is a similar kind of bias. 
However, the processes that drive biases have arisen for a reason – we cannot take into 
account all the information that surrounds us and so we need to select information to 
attend to in order for any action to be taken. The work of Gigerenzer and colleagues has 
shown that some heuristics can improve decision making.  For example, making fast 
decisions based on almost no information can yield better results that having some prior 
information which can bias decision making [42]. 
Finally, the organisational context must be considered both as an influence on individual 
level decision making and as an integral outcome of individual and group decision 
making processes. Choices are made at all levels of organisational design that are subject 
to the same processes of automaticity, flawed biases and self-regulation as individual 
decision making.  
3.1.4 Conclusion 
To conclude, a model of human reliability at the individual level and high reliability at 
the organisational level needs to integrate decision making and the dynamic interaction of 
actors and their environment. Using the models discussed above points to consider for 
future developments of HRA models. The models also lead to implications for improving 
individual and organisational safety and reliability, including the following. 
1. Understand the emotional and cognitive influences on decision making without 
having a blinkered approach to error management. 
2. Take into account the interaction between individuals and the environment. 
3. Debias decision making: be familiar with safety procedures not complacent about 
hazards. 
4. Create an environment where people understand their role in the overall process and 
there is open discussion of a wide range of organisational issues. 
3.2 Studies of high reliability organisations 
3.2.1 Introduction 
The past 20 years has seen several studies of high reliability organisations (HROs), which 
Roberts [23] defined as organisations failing with catastrophic consequences less than 
one time in 10,000.  These studies recognise that certain kinds of social organisation are 
capable of making even inherently vulnerable technologies reliable enough for a highly 
demanding society. An HRO encourages a culture and operating style which  emphasises 
the need for reliability rather than efficiency [24].   
As organisations, HROs emphasise a culture of learning, although they clearly do not rely 
in any sense of learning from mistakes! Instead, HROs resort to learning from 
imagination, vicarious experience, stories, simulations and other symbolic representations 
[24].  They also emphasise a culture of sharing their learning and knowledge, their mental 
models: ‘heedful inter-relating’ [43], ‘collective mindfulness’ [44], ‘extraordinarily 
dense’ patterns of cooperative behaviour [45] and ‘shared situation awareness’ [46].  
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Weick and Roberts [43] argue that in HROs develop aggregate mental processes exhibit 
qualities as noticing, taking care, attending and concentrating. Moreover, instead of a 
rigid division of labour, there are true teams in which all members share information and 
above all accept a joint responsibility for safety and reliability. 
Usually HROs apply a strategy of redundancy [47] with teams of operators ‘watching each 
others backs’.  As noted, teams share common mental models of both their internal 
organisational processes and the external world. Redundancy may increase complexity of 
operations as it makes the operations system less easily understood or opaque [13, 48]. 
However, redundancy also increases the probability or chance of getting adequate 
information to solve probable dangers, consequently reducing the risks arising from 
complexity rather then increasing them.   
When necessary, HROs try to decentralize the authority of senior teams or management 
responsible for decision making. La Porte and Consolini [49] describe patterns of 
authority in air traffic control changing between a normal, bureaucratic mode, a different 
mode in high tempo operations in which hierarchical rank defers to technical expertise, 
and a pre-programmed emergency response mode. Rijpma [50] suggests that HROs use 
decentralisation to enable those working closest to any problems to address and solve 
them as they emerge or become apparent. Using this method rapid problem solving is 
achieved, resulting in an increase in reliability and reduction of the risk of accidents 
occurring in highly critical situations.  This decentralisation may increase the complexity 
of the organisation as knowledge and lines of authority need to be distributed, but La 
Porte [45] suggests the balance of these opposing effects can lie in the direction of higher 
reliability.  Along with team-based organisational structures with devolved authority, 
HROs tend to have the capacity to change rapidly when circumstances demand [51].  
3.2.2 How do HROs relate to HRA 
There are some fundamental differences between the fields of HROs and HRA.  
• HRO theory is essentially descriptive, whereas HRA is normative, suggesting 
techniques to deal with variability and error in the human performance.  
• HRO theory looks at the organisations, teams, collective qualities like collective 
mindfulness [44], whereas HRA tend to focus on tasks undertaken by individuals.  
• In many respects, HRO theory emerged as a critique of normal accident theory [13]; 
HRA has largely emerged as a way of filling the human gap in technical risk 
assessment.  
• In perspective HRO is fundamentally optimistic in believing that social organisations 
can produce high reliability in the most demanding of circumstances, while HRA is 
fundamentally pessimistic because it concentrates on the human capacity to make 
errors. 
The two fields share a focus that is both human and social, suggest that any thinking 
about how HRA should develop might benefit from asking what is relevant about HROs. 
The particular ‘reliability’ to which their titles allude is remarkably similar. In both cases 
it has a strong connection not merely to things working as they should but also to notions 
of safety and hazard.  
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A common tone in writings about high reliability organisation is that high reliability 
originates in adversity.  Thus, for example, Weick [24] points out that reliability tends to 
increase when performance pressures are high, not low. Early ideas about HROs rather 
contradicted this notion of strength in adversity [49]; subsequent work, however, 
emphasises that HROs accept and deal with fluctuations, striving for resilience rather than 
invariance [52]. This quality of achieving particularly high reliability because of, not 
despite, the high stakes and demanding circumstances now tends to permeate HRO 
studies. 
3.2.3 The critique of HROs and reliability generally 
There are several challenges that have been mounted to the HRO line of work. First, some 
suggest that HRO perspectives are heavily functionalist and neglect politics and group 
interests [48, 53, 54].  A second criticism relates to the empirical studies underpinning 
HRO theory [48, 54, 55]. Critics argue that the context of some of the most important HRO 
studies, e.g. on the flight decks of aircraft carriers, is misleading, only evidence of safety 
in simulated rather than actual operations. Others argue that the mechanisms and qualities 
that are said to underlie the achievement of high reliability are neither particularly 
characteristic of HROs nor unequivocally good for reliability. Finally some challenge that 
what reliability means is somehow obvious, unitary and absolute. The argument always 
seems to be about such questions as whether organisations ‘really’ are reliable, whether 
this reliability can be called ‘high’, and what ‘actually’ produced the reliability, rather 
than what might be interesting and problematic about reliability as a concept.  
4 Case studies 
4.1 Nuclear 
The nuclear industry offers some of the best recorded incidents in which human error 
either led to a system failure or had the potential to do so.  For instance, we note briefly 
some events that indicate significant human potential for errors of commission or 
omission. 
• Three Mile Island.  The accident happened on 28 March 1979, at the Three Mile 
Island nuclear power plant near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania [56].  There was no 
significant release of radiation, but a full core melt was only just averted.  The causes 
of the accident continue to be debated to this day, but one thing is clear.  The 
initiating event, the formation of a hydrogen bubble which forced down cooling water 
exposing the core, had not been anticipated in the reactor’s design or safety studies.  
The operators not only did recognise what was happening, but also had never 
anticipated that it might.  It was an incident beyond their experience and imagination: 
in a very real sense outside of scientific and engineering knowledge as it stood then.  
A key learning point in relation to HRA is that the operators behaved entirely sensibly 
and in accordance with their mental models of what they believed was happening.  
There was no error in their behaviour in this respect, not at least in the sense of 
human error of HRA theory. 
• Chernobyl.  The Chernobyl accident occurred on 26 April 1986 and did involve an 
enormous release of radioactivity [57].  The accident itself, contrary to the TMI 
accident, was caused by a deliberate act, an experiment that caused an explosion and 
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fire. The experiment involved running the plant outside its design parameters at very 
low power. The personnel of the Chernobyl station were familiar with the experiment 
because they carried it out previously at the Chernobyl-3 reactor and the Kursk 
station in Russia [58]. However, the personnel responsible for the experiment had 
been working for some 15-20 hours when the experiment started because of delays in 
handing the reactor over for the experiment. They were tired and under pressure to 
complete the experiment quickly and return the reactor to normal energy production. 
During the experiment, they deliberately turned off three separate safety systems and 
switched to manual control. This was against safety instructions, but probably they 
had done it frequently before. In this case, human failure on on-line operations was 
caused by the effect that seemingly “freak infringement of rules” which did not cause 
an accident in the past lead to more violation of rules in the future [59]. The accident 
occurred without any component failure. However, the design of the reactor depended 
on the operators following certain safety instructions. As seen, the operating and 
regulatory regime in place was inadequate. Attempts by operators to recover the 
situation triggered flash boiling of water, which in turn led to a breach of fuel can or 
containment, and the exposure of the hot fuel element to water. Within seconds, a 
major chemical explosion occurred which destroyed the reactor and caused the worst 
nuclear catastrophe in history.  While there is no doubt that deliberate acts were key 
in causing the accident, there is equally no doubt that the tiredness, stress and poor 
safety culture within the operating team were contributing factors. 
• Doonreay Shaft.  A 65m deep shaft at the Doonreay nuclear power plant, originally 
dug to remove rock from a pipe discharging treated water was used from 1958 to 
1977 as a low level waste pit.  In 1977 there was a major explosion in the shaft 
caused by the reaction of sodium potassium (NaK) alloy with water.  Some 
radioactive waste was spread over a large area.  One can wonder about many things to 
do with the management of this pit, but one thing is clearly incredible: the deposition 
of NaK, albeit encased in cast iron, into the pit.  The scientists and engineers involved 
would surely have known that: (i) the shaft was wet – it linked to the discharge pipe 
and went below sea-level; (ii) NaK reacts explosively with water; and (iii) cast iron 
corrodes.  Put these facts together and the ‘accident’ was completely predictable. 
• Sellafield pigeons.  In 1998 it was discovered that pigeons were transferring 
radioactivity from the Sellafield nuclear site to the surrounding region10.  Although 
there had been many risk analyses at the plant over the years, this potential route for 
contamination to be taken off-site had not been anticipated. 
A recent leak at Sellafield is particularly relevant because many human and 
organisational behaviours interacted and led to the incident.  We therefore describe it in 
greater detail.  On April 20th 2005 a leak was detected in the Sellafield Thermal Oxide 
Reprocessing Plant (THORP) after a video camera revealed that approximately 83,000 
litres of radioactive waste, or dissolver liquid, had leaked into the base of the cell. Closer 
inspection revealed that a feed pipe to accountancy vessel V2217B had fractured. This is 
believed to have been due to fatigue stresses induced by excessive movement of the 
                                                 
10  http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/55612.stm 
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vessel to which the pipe is connected.  It is estimated that the pipe suffered major failure 
around the 15th of January, 2005, but may have started to leak as early as July 2004.  
Subsequent investigations indicated the following errors and behaviours all contributed to 
the leak itself and a failure to detect it sooner. 
• The vessel and pipework design was changed during the construction of the plant.  
The original design may well not have fractured in the same way.  However, during 
the preparation of the safety case for the plant, assumptions and precautions in 
relation to seismic activity were changed and the designed changed to allow for this.  
So a design fault that had originally been engineered out was re-introduced in another 
phase of the design process. 
• There were earlier indications that there might be a leak from accounting of the input 
and output to and from the cell.  However, these were largely ignored because of a 
‘new plant’ culture: see earlier remarks in Section 3.1.  There was a belief that such a 
modern plant could not suffer from leaks or other failures.  Some of the written 
operating instructions were ambiguous, leaving too much to the interpretation of the 
operating staff.  In the context of the ‘new plant’ culture and other management 
imperatives, it was too easy to ignore inconclusive but pertinent readings and 
observations.  It is also noteworthy that this ‘new plant’ culture was implicated in two 
previous smaller incidents elsewhere in THORP in 1998 and earlier in 2005. 
• Even when a decision was taken to investigate the leak, misunderstandings among 
senior management led to operations being continued to meet production targets 
longer than they should have been. 
The Board of Inquiry report [60] on the incident repeatedly makes the point that the ‘new 
plant’ culture was at the heart of many of the failings of the operators, management 
processes and organisation. 
4.2 Railway 
4.2.1 Lambrigg Derailment  
 
On 23rd February 2007, a Virgin train travelling from London to Glasgow derailed 
between Preston and Carlisle, at Lambrigg Ground Frame crossover located near 
Cumbria [61].  Of the 108 passengers and 4 crew members travelling aboard, one fatality 
resulted with a further 22 individuals requiring hospital treatment.  The immediate cause 
of the derailment was identified as faulty points on the track; this was in turn the result of 
a fault in the stretcher bar of the points which consequently led to the left and right switch 
rails to become disconnected.  Two securing bolts were also detached from the stretcher, 
one of which was lying next to the points while the other was missing entirely.  The nuts 
which secure the stretchers together, having being tightened with the incorrect 
equipment, became free due to dynamic loadings; this fault failed to be identified in a 
subsequent inspection due to unauthorised splitting of patrol groups.  As such faults could 
have potentially been identified and corrected through remedial action, prior to 
derailment, the incident could have thus been prevented as it was highlighted that the 
deterioration of the points had occurred some time before. 
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The causes highlighted above, which were the most apparent causes of the derailment, 
were further identified in the post-incident investigation, as having been caused by a 
number of underlying contributory factors based on human reliability and error.   
1. There existed a number of deficiencies in the inspection and maintenance regime 
ultimately causing the points to fall into disrepair and the fault thus being 
unidentified.  Such deficiencies included:   
• A breakdown in the local management structure responsible for inspection and 
maintenance.  Inspections carried out were found to be non compliant with set 
standards and procedures and supervisors tended to reinforce this behaviour as 
acceptable by employing unsafe inspection arrangements.   
• Track patrolling regime’s systematically failed to inspect the area adequately.  
Routine inspections routinely cover a required mileage of track; due to 
management incompetence the area of the track containing the fault was 
overlooked one week prior to the derailment; the subsequent patrol report was 
nevertheless authorised, with a gap in the inspection going unnoticed.   
2. Mandated standards were not communicated or executed in the required manner, with 
a lack of sample checking of the track to test inspection quality and arrangements.  
Between maintenance and track supervisory management there was evidence of a 
split ‘them and us’ culture which had consequential effects on the way in which 
operations were conducted. 
3. Patrolling of the track was poorly managed; patrollers were allocated to random 
patrol lengths thus compromising understanding of certain areas of the track and 
many of the patrollers’ certification of competence had lapsed with lack of evidence 
to suggest any assessment of monitoring; despite this lapse being highlighted to local 
management, it was ignored and this behaviour thus became acceptable.  There was 
no review of patrols and there was no definite method by which defects on site were 
marked, with checklists to identify these being used inconsistently.   
4. The quality assurance regime did not recognize failures in the reliability of inspection 
regimes or in the application of best practice.  Personnel were not briefed about any 
new standards requiring compliance and staffs’ competency in following practice was 
not managed.  Failure to follow rules and standards went unreported and not acted 
upon; such unacceptable behaviour was encouraged as it was enacted too by higher 
level supervisors.   
While the accident had a clear immediate physical cause in the faulty points, it is clear 
the real cause of the accident was human, managerial and organisational.  No single 
individual failed.  Rather many human factors contributed to the accident ranging from 
the managerial to the cultural.  
4.2.2 Saxmundham Collision (User worked crossing collision) 
On 22nd May 2006, a freight train collided with a car trying to cross at a User Worked 
Crossing (UWC) near Saxmundham, England.  No one was injured as a result of the 
collision and the train was not derailed, however both vehicles did suffer minor damages 
at the area of impact.  The concerned UWC is situated on a private road which from the 
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north to south side, leads to private dwellings.  Permitted users of the UWC include 
residents of the dwellings, farmers of the surrounding farmlands and users with 
authorised access from these residents including such parties as delivery vehicles. 
The immediate cause of the incident was reported to be the fault of the driver of the 
vehicle, who failed to stop at the check point to observe for oncoming trains.  In the 
incident report it was further disclosed that the authorised person who permitted the 
motorist to use the UWC did not give the motorist a briefing on how to use the crossing 
correctly i.e. in a safe manner. 
The findings of the inquiry highlighted additional causal factors leading to the occurrence 
of the incident, these were:  
• The gates on both sides of the crossing were found to have been left open for a 
lengthy period of time despite requiring to be closed when the crossing is not in use.  
The gates were unable to be closed due to the overgrown vegetation that had 
developed around them and thus rendered the gates usable; this was due to inadequate 
maintenance of the gates. 
• The motorist involved in the collision had used the crossing for 36 years and 6 times 
in the week leading up to the incident; in this time the driver had never come across a 
train on this section of the track.  Due to this past experience he, along with other 
authorised users, became accustomed to leaving the gates open and were thus of the 
expectation that a train would not come when the track was being crossed. 
Further factors concerning the crossing, which were not immediately apparent, were also 
thought to contribute to the incident:  
• the short warning time to alert a motorist of an oncoming train; 
• the signs which warn a user to stop and read how to cross safely had poor visibility 
due to shrouding by foliage and vegetation and, moreover, there were problems with 
their wording; 
• no telephone number was provided at the crossing for contacting a railway employee 
in the event of an accident. 
In the subsequent enquiry it was also disclosed that letters had been sent to the authorised 
users of this gate several times, reminding them of the rules regarding gate closure. When 
questioned, they could not explain why the gates were left open.  It is therefore probable 
that due to the low level of traffic the users became complacent about the safe use of the 
crossing.  In summary, there was no physical breakdown that caused the accident, but a 
number of unwanted behaviours arose through poor information flows, an unchecked 
growth in poor practice and complacency.  
4.3 Water  
The provision of safe drinking water that has the trust of customers is the overarching 
objective of the water utility sector.  The sourcing of raw water, its treatment, distribution 
and use by customers involves a complex array of processes, assets and procedures, all of 
which contribute to preventative risk management and to public health protection.  A 
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water distribution system for example, is an interconnected collection of sources, pipes, 
and hydraulic control elements (e.g., pumps, valves, regulators, and tanks) aimed at 
delivering water to consumers in prescribed quantities and at desired pressures. A typical 
water supply system is composed of water sources, raw water transmission pipes, water 
treatment plants, and water distribution networks. These subsystems expose a wide 
variety of risks for both natural and human-related influences since most of them are 
spatially diverse and accessible.  Critically for water supply systems, in event of failures, 
customers will usually have been exposed to pathogens and/or chemicals for some time 
before the effects (usually waterborne disease) become evident.  There is no opportunity 
for ‘product recall’ and often, many thousands of customers may have been exposed.  
Thus securing a culture of preventative risk management is critical to the provision of 
safe drinking water [62-65]. 
The experience with water systems has been that when failures occur, they may initially 
appear to be asset-centric (pipe bursts, filter breakthroughs etc.), but are frequently found 
also to have deep-seated causes, including human error.  Consider six cases selected from 
Hrudey and Hrudey [66] (Table 3), representing fatal drinking water outbreaks in affluent 
countries over the past 20 years where human error was implicated.  From the table, the 
most frequently occurred HRA factors contributing to the six outbreaks are risk not 
recognised, poor system design and installation, and poor maintenance. Each of them 
appears 4 times out of the 6 cases. Poor design, installation and maintenance are more or 
less associated with organisational influences in Reason’s Swiss Cheese model. This 
suggests latent errors are major causes in the outbreaks.  Water quality incidents are often 
triggered by major change – e.g., by extreme weather, livestock or wildlife faecal 
contamination – that presents a pathogenic challenge to the system under conditions at 
the edge or beyond its design parameters. 
Given the significant consequences that can arise from water quality incidents, research 
has begun on the development and embedding of a risk management culture within the 
sector.  But how do organisations to develop a risk management culture without having 
first to suffer a major accident?  Weick and Sutcliffe [67] apply the concept of  
‘mindfulness’ as one strategy to reduce the likelihood of accidents. Mindfulness is 
associated with a number of organisational characteristics: (i) preoccupation with failure 
and the root causes of it; (ii) reluctance to (over)simplify; (iii) sensitivity to operations; 
(iv) commitment to resilience; and (v) deference to expertise.  For water utilities seeking 
to develop mindfulness [64, 68]: 
• informed vigilance is actively promoted and rewarded; 
• there exists an understanding of the entire system, its challenges and limitations is 
promoted and actively maintained; 
• effective, real-time treatment process control, based on understanding critical 
capabilities and limitations of the technology, is the basic operating approach; 
• fail-safe multi-barriers are actively identified and maintained at a level appropriate to 
the challenges facing the system; 
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Table 3. Summary of fatal drinking water outbreaks in affluent countries over the past 20 years 














• vulnerable situation of sewage pump station upstream not 
recognized  
• failure of internal reporting of sewage spill to water operations  











• risks associated with water main break repair during extreme 
weather not recognized  
• poor sewerage systems maintenance exposing water 
distribution to risk  






cases,  4400 
hospital 
admissions  
50 deaths  
• risks associated with sewage contamination of water intake not 
recognized 
• apparently not aware of Cryptosporidium risk 
• failure to maintain optimum filtration performance 










• poor maintenance of water storage allowed faecal 
contamination 
• water quality management not based on good knowledge of 
system 







cases, 71 hospital 
admissions,  
2 deaths
• not aware of risk to well from septic seepage field 
• allowed use of unchlorinated water from a shallow well 
• failure to consider that extreme drought of previous summer 









cases of HUS,  
7 deaths
• ignored warnings about vulnerability of shallow well when 
first installed in 1978 
• failed to adopt source protection recommendations at 
installation 
• regulator failed to implement policy requiring continuous 
chlorine residual monitors on vulnerable shallow wells 
• operators inadequately trained with no knowledge that 
contaminated water could kill consumers 
• failure to recognize that extreme weather and flooding could 
cause water contamination   
• failure to maintain chlorine residuals 
• failure to monitor chlorine residuals as required 
• close calls are documented and used to train staff about how the system responded 
under stress and to identify what measures are needed to make such close calls less 
likely in future; 
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• operators, supervisors, lab personnel and management all understand that they are 
entrusted with protecting the public’s health and are committed to honouring that 
responsibility above all else; 
• operational personnel are afforded the status, training and remuneration 
commensurate with their responsibilities as guardians of the public’s health; 
• response capability and communication are improved, particularly as post 9-11 
bioterrorism concerns are being addressed; and 
• an overall continuous improvement, total quality management (TQM) mentality 
pervades the organisation. 
It is clear that as with the incidents occurring in the nuclear and rail transport industries, 
the water industry is subject to arrange of threats arising from poor organisational culture 
and management practices. 
5 The contexts of risk and reliability analyses 
5.1 Introduction 
There are many issues relating to the context in which human behaviour may contribute 
to a failure: e.g. 
• the team and local management structures which set the local context in which the 
operators work;  
• the organisational context – including strategic and economic imperatives – in which 
the teams and local management structures are embedded; 
• the cultural context and – including misplaced trust in other safety barriers in the 
system – in which the operators find themselves; 
• external influences on the operators, e.g. stresses from home life, tiredness; 
• the lack of recent incidents leading to a growth of complacency. 
All have been illustrated by the case studies discussed in the previous section.  There are 
at least one further contextual issue that we should consider and on which we have been 
silent: the decision making activity in which the operators are engaged when the ‘failure’ 
occurs.  It may seem a superfluous remark to make, but not all contexts in which human 
reliability is important are the same.  Some concern operators performing standard tasks 
at the right time and place.  Others require responses to novel, potentially catastrophic 
circumstances. Decision processes and reactions will vary accordingly.  This means that 
the appropriate HRA methodology to assess the risks associated with the operator’s 
behaviour may vary with the details of that context. 
Hollnagel [26] also discusses the contexts of responses to incidents in his development of 
CREAM.  However, his development and categorisation of contexts depends both on the 
underlying decision making activity and the various factors noted above which may 
affect human behaviour: see Section 5.4.  We believe that there is some value in 
separating the contextual issues that relate to the decision to be made from those that 
influence the behaviour of the operator(s) engaged in that decision making.   In Section 
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5.2 we introduce the Cynefin model of 
decision contexts and suggest how this 
may inform our discussion. 
5.2 Cynefin 
Cynefin is a conceptual framework 
developed by Snowden which, among 
other things, offers a categorisation of 
decision contexts [69].  The Cynefin 
model roughly divides decision contexts 
into four spaces: see Figure 2. In the 
known space, or the Realm of Scientific 
Knowledge, the relationships between 
cause and effect are well understood. All 
systems and behaviours can be fully 
modelled.  The consequences of any 
course of action can be predicted with near 
certainty.  In such contexts, decision making tends to take the form of recognising 
patterns and responding to them with well rehearsed actions. Klein [70] discusses such 
situations as recognition primed decision making; Snowden describes decision making in 
these cases as CATEGORISE AND RESPOND.   
Cause and effect can 
be determined with 
sufficient data 
Knowable 




The Realm of Social Systems 
Cause and effect may be 
determined after the event 
Chaotic 
Cause and effect 
not discernable 
Known 
The Realm of Scientific 
Knowledge 
Cause and effect understood 
and predicable 
 
Figure 2: Cynefin 
In the knowable space, the Realm of Scientific Inquiry, cause and effect relationships are 
generally understood, but for any specific decision there is a need to gather and analyse 
further data before the consequences of any course of action can be predicted with any 
certainty.  Decision analysis and support will include the fitting and use of models to 
forecast the potential outcomes of actions with appropriate levels of uncertainty.  This is 
the realm in which the standard methods of decision analysis as found in, say, Clemen 
and Reilly [71] apply.  Snowden characterises decision making in this space as SENSE 
AND RESPOND.   
In the complex space, often called the Realm of Social Systems though such complexity 
can arise in environmental, biological and other contexts, decision making situations 
involve many interacting causes and effects. Knowledge is at best qualitative: there are 
simply too many potential interactions to disentangle particular causes and effects. There 
are no precise quantitative models to predict system behaviours such as in the known and 
knowable spaces. Decision analysis is still possible, but its style will be broader, with less 
emphasis on details. Decision support will be more focused on exploring judgement and 
issues, and on developing broad strategies that are flexible enough to accommodate 
changes as the situation evolves.  Analysis may begin and, perhaps, end with much more 
informal qualitative models, sometimes known under the general heading of soft 
modelling, soft OR or problem structuring methods [72-76].  If quantitative models are 
used, then they are simple, perhaps linear multi-attribute value models [77].  Snowden 
suggests that in these circumstances decision making will be more of the form: PROBE, 
SENSE, AND RESPOND. 
Finally, in the chaotic space, situations involve events and behaviours beyond our current 
experience and there are no obvious candidates for cause and effect. Decision making 
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cannot be based upon analysis because there are no concepts of how separate entities and 
predict their interactions. Decision makers will need to take probing actions and see what 
happens, until they can make some sort of sense of the situation, gradually drawing the 
context back into one of the other spaces.  Snowden suggests that such decision making 
can be characterised as ACT, SENSE AND RESPOND.  More prosaically, we might say ‘trial 
and error’ or even ‘poke it and see what happens!’ 
The boundaries between the four spaces should not be taken as hard.  The interpretation 
is much softer with recognition that there are no clear cut boundaries and, say, some 
contexts in the knowable space may well have a minority of characteristics more 
appropriate to the complex space. 
The Cynefin framework provides a structure in which to articulate some concerns about 
the use if HRA in risk and reliability analysis and in relation to HRO studies. 
• First generation HRA methodologies and arguably most of second and third generation 
ones focus on tasks that lie in the known or knowable spaces.  Yet many of the 
perceived risks in modern systems arise because of their inherent complexity: cf. the 
normal accident theory of Perrow [13, 54].  In other words, we need be concerned 
with human behaviour as managers and operators strive to deal with events happening 
in the complex or even chaotic spaces.  The Chernobyl Accident was initially 
managed as if it were in the known and knowable spaces, yet it was one of the most 
complex socio-technical accidents that have occurred [16, 78].  In the Three Mile 
Island Accident initially there was no conceptual understanding of the processes by 
which a hydrogen bubble might form and hence decision making in the first hours 
and days of handling the incident took place in the chaotic space.   
• It is informative to read HRO studies from the perspective of Cynefin.  For instance, 
Weick’s classic paper [24] moves from discussions of how air traffic controllers 
manage flights in a highly reliable way – a repetitive task in the known/knowable 
spaces – and uses these to discuss how teams might react to complex events such as 
Bhopal, the decision to launch Challenger and the Three Mile Island Accident.  It is 
far from clear that organisational practices that enable repetitive, intrinsically 
dangerous operations to be carried out safely can be used to develop organisational 
preparedness dealing with complex situations that bring many risks, some quite 
unanticipated.  
Applying Cynefin to decision making has helped decision analysts recognise that 
different methodologies may be needed for decision contexts lying in the different spaces 
[31].   We believe that it can serve the same purpose in delineating when different HRA 
methodologies are appropriate. 
Up until now we have discussed the implications of behavioural, organisational, and 
cultural contexts for human behaviour within a system and the consequences of this 
behaviour for the system’s reliability.  We have noted that that are many different types 
of activity required of the operator in contexts varying from the known to the complex 
and chaotic.  In the next section we discuss the varying purposes that might be served by 
an HRA and which set the context for the analysis – as opposed to the context in which the 
system being analysed operates.  We have already noted that an HRA may serve 
S. French 28 19/1/2010 
Human Reliability Analysis 
formative or summative objectives.  In the next section we enlarge upon the implications 
of these. 
5.3 Why perform HRA? 
There are many reasons why one might undertake an HRA: e.g.  
• In the design of a system one may be concerned with ‘designing out’ the potential for 
system failure.  Part of this involves analysing how human behaviour may affect the 
system in its potential both to compromise its reliability and to avoid the threat of 
imminent failure. 
• During licensing discussions between a government regulator and the system operator 
there may be a need to demonstrate that a system meets a safety target. 
• Sometimes an organisation wants to restructure and change its reporting structures.  
In such circumstances, it may wish to understand how its organisational design may 
affect the reliability and safety of its systems; and in turn that understanding may 
inform the development of its safety culture. 
• There may be a need to modify a system in which case there are needs to design the 
modification and the project to deliver the modification.   
• There may be a need to choose which of several potential systems to purchase and the 
risk of system failure may be a potential differentiator between the options. 
Risks occur throughout the life cycle: during construction or installation, during 
operation, during modification and during decommissioning.  In event of failure at any 
stage there are risks associated with repair and recovery.  In all cases HRA will inform 
risk management.  Sometimes, it will be possible to consider controlling risk to within 
society norms; in the case of repair and recovery, there may be no choice but to take what 
normally would be considered excessive risk.   
Thus there are many contexts and reasons for conducting an HRA.  It would be surprising, 
therefore, if one HRA methodology served all.  Yet, often reading the proponents of a 
given HRA methodology, there is a suggestion, perhaps implicit, that their methodology 
might serve all contexts.  Equally critics of a methodology may point to particular faults 
without the recognition that for some contexts these may not be relevant.  In the Section 6 
we shall argue that within any large scale system risk or reliability analysis, there will be 
many points at which human behaviour may be a factor leading to system failure.  Which 
HRA methodology is adopted at any one of these points will depend on the many 
contextual issues and purposes of the overall analysis discussed above.  Thus the overall 
analysis may involve several HRA methodologies.  But first we should note that 
Hollnagel’s CREAM [26] methodology is to some extent based upon the same conception. 
5.4 The importance of context in Hollnagel’s CREAM methodology 
Hollnagel [26] also recognises that there are many contextual issues that determine the 
appropriateness of a particular HRA.  He suggests that the context should be categorised 
in various ways including four control modes: opportunistic, tactical, strategic and 
scrambled.  At first sight these look rather similar to the four categories of decision 
contexts in Cynefin.  However, there is one significant difference.  Cynefin categorises 
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the decision context without reference to behaviour of the human taking the decision.  
Hollnagel’s classification confounds these factors.  Since it is perfectly possible for one 
individual to face up to the strategic response to incident in a calm focused frame of 
mind, while another may be distracted or in state close to panic, to confound these factors 
is to miss one of the key challenges of HRA.   
Hollnagel’s CREAM methodology encompasses two analytical approaches:  basic CREAM 
and extended CREAM.  The former is quicker to apply, makes more approximations and 
presumably more suited when one needs rough guidance, e.g., on the relative risks 
resulting from human behaviour in different parts of a system; whereas the latter gives a 
more precise answer for circumstances when greater quantification is needed.  Thus in 
this sense Hollnagel has begun to address the need for different HRA methods to meet the 
different possible purposes of such analyses.  However, there are two issues that arise.  
Firstly, given the wide range of reasons for conducting an HRA given above, one may 
question whether two analytical approaches are sufficient.  Second and more importantly, 
Bedford and Bayley [79] have tried applying both basic and extended CREAM to the same 
context and obtained inconsistent answers.  It seems that the former method is not a 
consistent approximation to the latter. 
6 The need for a portfolio of HRA methodologies 
6.1 Behaviour not error 
We have made the point several times that we should not think of the issue being one of 
assessing the risks of human ‘error’ or ‘failure’.  Human reliability should focus on the 
interaction of a variety of human behaviours and the operation of the overall system.  To 
do it job, HRA does not need to attribute pejorative terms such as ‘error’, ‘slip’ or ‘failure’ 
to a particular behaviour.  It simply needs to ask what the humans are doing and can do at 
a particular point in the operation of the system.  What behaviours might they exhibit and 
what effects might these behaviours have on the system?  
In any particular application of HRA methods, there is a need to ensure that its focus is on 
a sufficiently wide grouping of the human part of the system.  If one is examining the 
likelihood of a slow response to a signal on a computer screen then perhaps it is sufficient 
to consider the cognitive behaviour of an individual operator.  If, however, the interest is 
in the likelihood that several signals will be ignored by several operators, then not only 
should the cognitive behaviour of one individual be considered but also the group 
dynamics of the team of operators and perhaps a wider range of organisational 
behaviours.  Even when the focus is on a single operator there may be a need to consider 
management and other behaviours around him or her and perhaps training systems. 
The focus should also be sufficiently wide in temporal terms.  If an operator realises that 
his or her response to a signal was slow, he or she may reschedule immediate tasks or 
adopt some other strategy to recover and prevent a system failure.  We rely on people in a 
system not just for their ability to perform many complex and sensitive tasks but also for 
their intelligence and ingenuity in resolving problems.  Thus HRA should assess human 
behaviour and its effects from the initiating event or behaviour through to the point at 
which the overall system passes into a different state from its planned operation.    
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Perhaps we should refer not to human reliability analysis but to human behaviour 
analysis and its role in overall system risk and reliability studies.  However, it is not the 
name that matters but the apparent quest for a single HRA method applicable to all tasks. 
6.2 Context matters! 
Our contention is that the variety of tasks that HRA is called upon to perform and the 
range of contexts in which it is applied are so great that it would be optimistic in the 
extreme to expect one method to be sufficient to meet these requirements.  Hollnagel [26] 
recognised this, though his suggestion of two methods probably does not take us much 
further forward.  What we believe is needed is a portfolio of HRA methods.  The 
characteristics of each need to be well understood so that we can determine the 
appropriate contexts for its application and appreciate its accuracy. 
First we need to recognise the context of the analysis itself.  Why do we need to assess 
the risk or reliability of the system?  In Section 5.3 we indicated a range of possible 
reasons for needing to perform such analyses.  We need to recognise that some of these 
will need quantitative output, while other times more qualitative output may suffice.  In 
qualitative cases, sometimes we need a ranking; but in the early stages of designing a 
system it may suffice to have an understanding of the human behavioural issues that may 
affect its performance and put it at risk of some system failure. If quantitative output is 
needed, then it will be necessary to have an understanding of the bounds on the numbers 
produced.  How accurate are they?  This will be particularly important in demonstrating 
that a safety target is reached – or maybe that they can never be reached.  If Perrow’s 
theory of normal accidents [13, 54] is to be believed, then some targets of, say, less than 
one failure in 107 years may be unachievable for some very complex systems; and the 
demonstration of this may well be based upon modelling limitations on the cognitive 
capacity of the operators or related behavioural issues. 
We should note here that a good quantitative method may not necessarily provide the best 
qualitative information.  ‘Black Box’ models [80], for instance, cannot by definition 
bring qualitative understanding.  Even statistical prediction based upon measureable 
system and human behavioural factors may not bring much true qualitative 
understanding.  Equally, good qualitative models may not develop easily into good 
quantitative models.  Thus the purpose of the overall analysis does much to define the 
type of HRA method that should be adopted. 
A system risk or reliability analysis should begin by exploring potential hazards and 
points at which failure may occur.  Some of these will be clearly associated with human 
operations and interventions; but we should recognise that all failure modes potentially 
have human behavioural aspects once introduce considerations of response and recovery 
actions.  Traditionally, task analysis is used to identify the points at which human activity 
can lead to system failure.  Essentially one investigates what happens if an operator fails 
to complete an assigned task in the expected manner.  However, while this is a necessary 
step in identifying possible ways in which human behaviour may be involved in system 
failure, it is not sufficient.  Firstly, recovery actions introduce human behavioural aspects 
into all possible failure modes.  Secondly and more importantly, task analysis focuses on 
closely related groups of operations – generally closely related not just conceptually, but 
also in terms of time and space.  Yet organisational and cultural effects can correlate 
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many aspects of behaviour in very different areas of operations.  Remember our 
discussion of the Swiss Cheese Model (Section 2.1).  Task analysis focuses attention on 
the potential ‘holes in the cheese layers’ whereas the wider behavioural issues can lead to 
‘movement of the cheese layers’ becoming correlated.  In design terms this means that 
the safety barriers that are built into the system, be they physical or organisational, may 
not be as independent as their designer think initially. 
The appropriateness of any HRA method may depend on the decision context that is being 
assessed.  Are we considering a repetitive task that an operator performs in the normal 
course of events?  In which case we need modelling approaches that fit with behaviours 
in the known domain.  Or are we looking at the response of an operator to something 
unexpected that may herald a departure of the system from its normal operating 
characteristics?  In which case we need modelling behaviours for the knowable, complex 
or even chaotic domain.  For repetitive events the key contextual pressures on operators 
that may modify their behaviour are likely to relate to complacency and organisational 
issues such as excessive workloads or requirements to work at the same task too long.  
External pressures and distractions such family problems or a national sporting event are 
more likely to affect behaviour in repetitive normal operations than in responding to the 
unexpected.  In responding to events ranging from an indication of departure from normal 
operations to a full blown crisis, adrenaline, the importance of the matter, as well as 
cognitive interest are likely to focus the mind.  So the operators’ performance is more 
likely to be affected by issues such as cognitive overload, miscommunication between 
several operations and a range of behaviours that we commonly call panic!  
Organisational contexts that affect the operators’ responses relate to, inter alia, the 
provision of training, including emergency simulations in a variety of scenarios, and the 
establishment of common mental models among response teams and, more generally, of 
supportive team behaviours.  Thus to assess the appropriateness of any HRA method to a 
decision context, it is necessary to understand how each models such cognitive, 
behavioural and organisational effects and their strengths and weaknesses in doing so.   
In summary, to choose an appropriate HRA method one needs to consider: 
• the purpose of the analysis 
• the decision context; 
• the organisational, cultural, and managerial contexts. 
6.3 Building a coherent composite analysis 
Thus we would expect that several HRA methods would be used in a full systems risk or 
reliability analysis.  At each point where human behaviour was an issue, an HRA 
appropriate for the task/decision context and for the purposes of the analysis would be 
chosen.  The outputs of these would be drawn together into the overall systems risk or 
reliability analysis.  The need to draw them together means that it is important that the 
HRA and other component risk and reliability modelling cohere in a number of respects. 
• Datasets need to be common across all analyses; and the inputs and outputs of 
different analyses need to be compatible in many ways such as unit, accuracy and, 
most importantly, operational meaning.  It is more than possible for models to involve 
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parameters known by the same name, but to differ in terms their precise definitions 
within the models.   
• Environmental parameters should represent the same context.  The operation of the 
system needs to be explored within a consistent representation of the external world – 
and that includes not just the physical, but also the political, social and economic 
environment. 
• The component analyses should be based upon compatible sets of assumptions.  It 
would be clearly quite wrong to assume that an operator can work at some level of 
effectiveness for up to 90 min at one point of the analysis; and for up to 120 min at 
another point.  But there are also many more subtle modelling assumptions made in 
any analysis and these need to be compatible across the whole systems analysis. 
• The underlying methodological foundations should be compatible.  For instance, it is 
far from clear that probabilistic methods can be safely combined with fuzzy or 
possibility methods [4, 81, 82].  In short, the different component methods drawn 
together into the full systems analysis should ‘speak the same language’. 
We have already noted that the basic and extended CREAM methods would seem to be 
incompatible in some of these respects [79]. 
6.4 Future research directions 
How far are we from this conception of the role of HRA in systems risk or reliability 
analyses?  A long way, probably. 
First, let us assume for the present that we have available enough HRA methods for our 
needs.  If we are to select from this portfolio an appropriate HRA method for particular 
part of the full analysis, we need to be able to compare them in terms their relative 
appropriateness for: 
• the decision context, 
• the organisational, cultural, and managerial contexts, 
• the purpose, i.e. formative or summative, of the analysis and the accuracy needed 
from it. 
We also need to compare the methods in terms of their compatibility and overall 
coherence. 
While there are some comparative studies of some of the methods [e.g., 27, 83-85], there 
are too few to build full and consistent comparisons of the methods that are available. 
More are needed.  Moreover, the comparisons need to recognise that each method may be 
appropriate some contexts but not others.  Once this is done, we can then identify the 
gaps in our portfolio.  For what contexts do we have no appropriate HRA methods and 
how might further methods be developed for these? 
Second, the community needs to consider how the overall system risk or reliability 
analysis is pulled together.  We have already noted that the Swiss Cheese model 
predisposes analysts to decompose systems into independent layers. We have also noted 
that human and organizational behaviours can become a common cause of failure in 
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different parts of the systems, correlating these layers.  The risk and reliability 
community need to recognise this and break away in some respects from the mindset 
engendered by the Swiss Cheese model: see also [86].  There needs to be a recognition 
that correlations due to behavioural and organisational issues can connect different 
subsystems in perhaps unexpected ways.  Thus more than ever analysts need to challenge 
assumptions of independence between subsystems. 
Third, the terminology of the discipline needs to change to recognise that failures can 
arise as a result of perfectly rational and reasonable behaviours.  The HRA community 
needs to widen its focus from error to all human behaviour.  In many ways the 
development of second and third generation HRA methods recognise this, but it seems 
very likely that there is a considerable way to go.  To have an indication of how far, we 
need to explore and draw together the HRA, behavioural and cognitive sciences, and 
organisation theory literatures and explore the implications of each for the others. 
7 Summary and Conclusion 
Our project may not have led to a ‘rethinking of human reliability analyses’ at least not in 
the sense of seeing how a single all-embracing method might be developed.  However, 
we have become acutely aware that a wide variety of contextual issues have not been 
fully appreciated and that these determine the characteristics needed in any HRA 
application.  Moreover, we believe that the discipline has been dominated by too great a 
focus on human ‘error’ rather than a more balanced recognition that all human behaviour 
has potential to cause a system failure.  In the previous section, we outlined three 
developments that we believe are needed:  
(i) comparative analyses of the HRA methods that already exist and gap analyses 
to identify the need for further methods;  
(ii) a greater recognition that human and organisational behaviour can act as a 
common cause, correlating failures in different subsystems or safety barriers;  
(iii) a greater exploration of what can be learnt from the behavioural, cognitive and 
organisational sciences.   
Until these steps are taken, we believe that it will be impossible to meet the need for 
society to understand and manage the risks brought by systems of ever-increasing 
complexity. 
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Appendix A:  List of Abbreviations and Acronyms 
AEMA action error mode analysis 
APJ absolute probability judgement 
ATHEANA a technique for human error analysis 
CCA cause-consequence analysis 
CFP cognitive failure probability (concept in CREAM) 
COCOM contextual control model 
CPC common performance condition (concept in CREAM) 
CREAM Cognitive reliability and error analysis method 
EFC error forcing conditions 
EOC errors of commission 
EOO errors of omission 
EPC error producing condition (concept in HEART) 
FA functional analysis 
FMEA failure modes and effects analysis 
FTA fault tree analysis 
GBAS ground based augmentation system 
GEMS generic error modelling system 
HAZOP hazard and operability analysis 
HCR human cognitive reliability 
HEART human error assessment and reduction technique 
HEAT human error action taxonomy (concept in CREAM) 
HEP human error probability 
HFE human failure event 
HRA human reliability analysis 
HEART human reliability analysis event tree 
HRO high reliability organisation 
IDA influence diagrams approach 
JHEDI justification of human error data information 
LOCA loss of coolant accident 
MAUD multi-attribute utility decomposition 
MMI man-machine interface 
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MTO man-technology organisation 
NGT nominal group technique 
NRC nuclear regulatory commission 
OR operational research 
ORCA operator reliability calculation and assessment 
PHEA predictive human error analysis (concept in CREAM) 
PRA probability risk assessment 
PSA probabilistic safety assessment 
PSF performance shaping factor 
RCA root cause analysis 
SARAH systematic approach to the reliability assessment of humans 
SHARP systematic human action reliability procedure 
SLI success likelihood index 
SLIM success-likelihood index methodology 
SRK skill-rule-knowledge 
STAHR socio-technical assessment of human reliability 
TESEO Tecnica Empirica Stima Errori Operatori  
THERP technique for human error rate prediction 
THORP (Sellafield) thermal oxide reprocessing plant 
TQM total quality management 
TRC time reliability correlation 
UA unsafe action 
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Appendix B:  A survey of HRA methods  
Absolute Probability Judgement 
Absolute Probability Judgement (APJ) is a technique used in the field of HRA for the 
purposes of evaluating the probability of a human error occurring throughout the 
completion of a specific task.  From such analyses measures can then be taken to reduce 
the likelihood of errors occurring within a system and therefore lead to an improvement 
in the overall levels of safety.  There exist three primary reasons for conducting an HRA; 
error identification, error quantification and error reduction.  HRA techniques have been 
utilised in a range of industries including healthcare, engineering, nuclear, transportation 
and business sector; each technique has varying uses within different disciplines. 
APJ, which is also known as Direct Numerical Estimation [87], is based on the 
quantification of HEPs.  Expert judgement is typically desirable for utilisation in HRA 
when there is little or no data with which to calculate HEPs, or when the data is unsuitable 
or difficult to understand. In theory, qualitative knowledge built through the experts’ 
experience can be translated into quantitative data such as HEPs.  
Required of the experts is a good level of both substantive experience (i.e. the expert 
must have a suitable level of knowledge of the problem domain) and normative 
experience (i.e. it must be possible for the expert, perhaps with the aid of a facilitator, to 
translate this knowledge explicitly into probabilities).  If experts possess the required 
substantive knowledge but lack knowledge which is normative in nature, the experts may 
be trained or assisted in ensuring that the knowledge and expertise requiring to be 
captured is translated into the correct probabilities i.e. to ensure that it is an accurate 
representation of the experts’ judgements.  
Background 
APJ is an expert judgement-based approach which involves using the beliefs of experts 
(e.g. front-line staff, process engineers etc.) to estimate HEPs. There are two primary 
forms of the technique; Group Methods and Single Expert Methods i.e. it can be done 
either as a group or as an individual exercise. Group methods tend to be the more popular 
and widely used as they are more robust and can be used to generate a consensus opinion.  
Moreover, within the context of use, it is unusual for a single individual to possess all the 
required information and expertise to be able to estimate solely, in an accurate manner, 
the human reliability in question.  In the group approach, the outcome of aggregating 
individual knowledge and opinions is more reliable, in the sense that it allows for 
different expertises to be represented in the expert group. 
APJ Methodologies 
There are four main group methods by which APJ can be conducted. 
• Aggregated Individual Method 
Utilising this method, experts make their estimates individually without actually 
meeting or discussing the task. The estimates are then aggregated by taking the 
geometric mean of the individual experts’ estimates for each task (though in other 
expert judgement applications it is more common to take a weighted arithmetic 
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average – possibly with the weights being determined by performance, see Cooke 
[82].  The major drawback to this method is that there is no shared expertise through 
the group; however a positive of this is that due to the individuality of the process, 
any conflict such as dominating personalities or conflicting personalities is avoided 
and the results are therefore free of any bias.   
• Delphi Method 
Developed by Dalkey [88, 89], this method is very similar to the Aggregated 
Individual Method in that experts make their initial estimates in isolation.  However 
following this stage, the experts are then shown the outcome that all other participants 
have arrived at and are then able to re-consider the estimates which they initially 
made.  The re-estimates are then aggregated using the geometric mean.   This allows 
for some information sharing, whilst avoiding most group-led biases; however their 
still remains the problem of a lack of discussion. 
• Nominal Group Technique (NGT) 
This technique takes the Delphi method and introduces limited 
discussion/consultation between the experts. By this means, information-sharing is 
superior, and group domination is mitigated by having the experts separately come to 
their own conclusion before aggregating the HEP scores. 
• Consensus Group Method 
This is the most group-centred approach and requires that the group must come to a 
consensus on the HEP estimates through discussion and mutual agreement. This 
method maximises knowledge-sharing and the exchange of ideas and also promotes 
equal opportunity to participate in discussion.  However, it can also prove to be 
logistically awkward to co-ordinate as it requires that all experts be together in the 
same location in order for the discussion to take place.  If the circumstance arises in 
which there is a deadlock or breakdown in group dynamics, it then becomes 
necessary to revert to one of the other group APJ methods. 
APJ Procedure 
1. Select subject matter experts 
The chosen experts must have a good working knowledge of the tasks which require 
to be assessed.  The correct number of experts is dependent upon what seems most 
practicable, while considering any constraints such as spatial and financial 
availability.  However, it should be noted that the larger the group the more likely 
problems are to arise. 
2. Prepare task statement 
Task statements are a necessary component of the method; tasks are specified in 
detail.  The more fuller the explanation of the task within the statement, the less likely 
it will be that the experts will resort to making individual guesses about the tasks.  
The statement should also ensure that any assumptions are clearly stated in an 
interpretable format for all experts to understand.  The optimal level of detail will be 
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governed by the nature of the task under consideration and the required use of the 
final HEP estimation.  
3. Prepare response booklet 
These booklets detail the task statement and design of the scale to use in assessing 
error probability and by which experts can indicate their judgements [87]. The scale 
must be one which allows differences to be made apparent.  The booklet also includes 
instructions, assumptions and sample items. 
4. Develop instructions for subjects 
Instructions are required to specify to the experts the reasons for the session, 
otherwise they may guess such reasons which may cause bias in the resultant 
estimates of human reliability.   
5. Obtain judgements 
Experts are required to reveal their judgements on each of the tasks; this can be done 
in a group or individually.  If done by the former means, a facilitator is often used to 
prevent any bias and help overcome any problems.   
6. Calculate inter-judge consistency 
This is a method by which the differences in the HEP estimates of individual experts 
can be compared; a statistical formulation is used for such purposes.  
7. Aggregate individual estimates 
Where group consensus methods are not used, it is necessary to compute an aggregate 
for each of the individual estimates for each HEP. 
8. Uncertainty bound estimation  
Calculated, or assessed, by using statistical approaches involving confidence ranges. 
(Note that these will usually not be confidence intervals in the usual sense of 
statistics, but will represent the expert group confidence in making their predictions). 
Worked Example [87] 
Context:  In this example, APJ was utilised by Eurocontrol, at the experimental centre in 
Bretigny Paris, using a group consensus methodology.    
Required Inputs:  Each of the grades of staff included in the session took turns to provide 
estimates of the error probabilities, including ground staff, pilots and controllers.  Prior to 
the beginning of the session, an introductory exercise was conducted to allow the 
participants to feel more comfortable with use of the technique; this involved an 
explanation to the background of the method and provided an overview of what the 
session would entail of.  To increase familiarity of the method, exemplary templates were 
used to show how errors are estimated.  
Method:   
1. Initial task statements of the project were created leaving space for individual opinion 
of task estimates and additional assumptions the group may have collectively 
foregone. 
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2. A session was held in which the individual scenarios and tasks were accurately 
detailed to the experts 
3. Experts, with this knowledge, were then able to enter individual estimations for all 
tasks under consideration 
4. Discussion followed in which all participants were provided with the opportunity to 
express their opinion to the rest of the group 
5. Facilitation was then used in order to reach a group consensus on the estimate values.  
Further discussion and amendment took place when necessary.  
During the duration of the session it was revealed that the ease with which the experts 
were able to arrive at a consensus was low with regards to the differing estimates of the 
various HEP values.  Discussions often changed individuals’ thinking e.g. in the light of 
new information or interpretations, but this did not ease reaching an agreement.  Due to 
this difficulty, it was therefore necessary to aggregate the individual estimates in order to 
calculate a geometric mean of these.   
The following table displays a sample of the results obtained.   
Table:  Pilot APJ Session – extract of results 
Excluding PC test (unsound expertise discarded)   
Potential Error 
{Code in Risk 
Model} Maximum Minimum Range Geometric Mean 
C1a  1.1E-03 2.0E-05 55 2.1E-04 
C1b  2.5E-04 1.0E-05 25 3.5E-05 
D1  1.0E-03 1.0E-04 10 4.3E-04 
F1a  4.0E-04 1.0E-05 40 6.9E-05 
F1b  1.0E-03 1.0E-04 10 4.0E-04 
F1c  1.0E-03 1.0E-04 10 4.6E-04 
 
In various cases, the range of figures separating the maximum and minimum values 
proved to be too large to allow to aggregated value to be accepted with confidence 
These values are the events in the risk model which require to be quantified.  There are 3 
primary errors in the model that may occur:  
• C1: Capturing false information about final approach path 
• D1: Failure to maintain a/c on  final approach path 
• F1: Selecting wrong runway 
There were various reasons which can explain the reasons why there was such a large 
difference in the estimates provided by the group: the group of experts was largely 
diverse and the experience of the individuals differed.  Experience with Ground Based 
Augmentation System (GBAS) also showed differences.  This process was a new 
experience for all of the experts participating in the process and there was only a single 
day, in which the session was taking place, to become familiar with its use and use it 
correctly.  Of most significance was the fact that the detail of the assessments was very 
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fine, which the staff were not used to.  Experts also became confused about the way in 
which the assessment took place; errors were not considered on their own and were 
analysed as a group.  This meant that the values estimated represented a contribution of 
the error on a system failure as opposed to a single contribution to system failure.   
Results/Outcomes:   
• Controllers and pilots provided good estimates for the errors and these have been 
used in some safety cases 
• Participants highlighted their understanding of the importance of their participation in 
the process to provide expertise, as opposed to using external safety analysts instead 
i.e. their understood their role in carrying out a HRA of the system 
• The experts were provided with a realistic representation of human performance 
within the system and therefore further safety requirements required to improve the 
safety and reduce the likelihood of the identified errors.  This is particularly 
beneficial; for the future GBAS. 
Lessons from the study:
Time is required to familiarise with the methodology and to understand what is needed to 
be done in the given context. 
Experts are required to understand the circumstances in which HEPs are conditional. 
There is a need for true experts to be included in the process and in significant number to 
allow for the necessary information to be gathered. 
The use of existing information in the process is always helpful for the purposes of 
standardisation. 
Advantages of APJ 
• The method is relatively quick and straightforward to employ. With a greater degree 
of group discussion in use of the technique, there is more qualitative data that is 
produced; this can be considered as a useful by-product of the assessment [87]. 
• APJ is not restricted to or specialised for use in a particular field; it is easily applicable 
to an HRA on any industrial sector thus making it a generic technique for use in a wide 
range of potential applications [90]. 
• Useful suggestions may result from discussion as to ways in which a reduction in 
errors can be achieved [91]. 
Disadvantages of APJ 
• APJ is prone to judgemental biases and group conflicts or problems. Selection of the 
correct group methodology or high-quality group facilitation may decrease the effect 
of these biases and increase the validity of the results [87]. 
• Locating suitable experts for the APJ exercise is a difficult stage of the process, more 
so due to the ambiguity with which the term ‘expert’ can be defined [90]. 
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• Because there may be little or no empirical and/or quantitative reasoning 
underpinning the experts’ estimates, it is difficult to be certain of the validity of the 
final HEPs i.e. there is no means by which guesses can be validated [87]. 
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A Technique for Human Error Analysis (ATHEANA) 
ATHEANA [92] is a technique used in the field of HRA for the purposes of evaluating the 
probability of a human error occurring throughout the completion of a specific task.  
From such analyses measures can then be taken to reduce the likelihood of errors 
occurring within a system and therefore lead to an improvement in the overall levels of 
safety.  There exist three primary reasons for conducting an HRA; error identification, 
error quantification and error reduction.  HRA techniques have been utilised in a range of 
industries including healthcare, engineering, nuclear, transportation and business sector; 
each technique has varying uses within different disciplines. 
ATHEANA is used in both retrospective analyses, that is in analysing incidents that have 
occurred, and in prospective analyses, that is in analysing incidents that could occur.  
After a series of studies of plant incidents, it was observed that the incidents occurred in a 
context where the combination of plant state, performance shaping factors and 
dependencies led, almost inevitably, to a human error. Hence the main underlying 
principle of ATHEANA is that error forcing conditions (EFCs) are described for non-
nominal situations. Application of ATHEANA in probabilistic risk analysis hence requires 
an assessment of the possible EFCs and their likelihoods. The various drivers of an 
incident and the possible outcomes are categorised into one of the following groupings: 
organisational influences; performance shaping factors; error mechanisms; unsafe 
actions; human failure event; unacceptable outcome(s).  The outcome provided by 
ATHEANA identifies various human actions within a system while also eliciting many 
contextual situations within this system, which influence whether the action will be 
carried out successfully or will lead to failure. 
Background 
ATHEANA is both a retrospective and prospective HRA methodology developed by the US 
nuclear industry regulatory commission in 2000.  It was developed in the hope that 
certain types of human behaviour in nuclear plants and industries, which use similar 
processes, could be represented in a way in which they could be more easily understood.  
It seeks to provide a robust psychological framework to evaluate and identify PSFs - 
including organisational/environmental factors - which have driven incidents involving 
human factors, primarily with the intention of suggesting process improvement [92].  
Essentially it is a method of representing complex accident reports within a standardised 
structure, which may be easier to understand and communicate. 
ATHEANA methodology 
The basic steps of the ATHEANA methodology are [93]: 
1. Define and interpret the issue under consideration 
2. Detail the required scope of analysis 
3. Describe the Base case scenario for a given initating event, including the norm of 
operations within the environment, considering actions and procedures. 
4. Define Human Failure Events (HFEs) and/or unsafe actions (UAs) which may affect 
the task in question 
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5. Identify potential vulnerabilities in the operators’ knowledge base. 
6. Search for deviations from the base case scenario for which UAs are likely. 
7. Identify and evaluate complicating factors and links to PSFs. 
8. Evaluate recovery potential.  
9. Quantify HFE probability 
10. Incorporate results into the PRA. 
A schematic outline of the method is provided below [94].  
 
 
Figure.   Schematic outline of ATHEANA 
The probability of a HFE in ATHEANA, given a particular initiator, is determined by 
summing over the different error forcing conditions associated to the HEF, taking account 
of the likelihood of unsafe actions given the EFC, and the likelihood of no recovery action 
given the EFC and the UA. 
Advantages 
• The most significant advantage of ATHEANA is that it provides a much richer and 
more holistic understanding of the context concerning the Human Factors known to 
be the cause of the incident, as compared with most first generation methods.   
• It may also be suggested that carrying out the qualitative model structuring leads to 
the enhancement of understanding as it requires stakeholders and decision makers to 
consider and discuss the contributing aspects as part of the model-building procedure.   
• It increases the guarantee that the key risks associated with the HFEs in question have 
been identified11. 
• Utilising the ATHEANA methodology, it is possible to estimate HEPs considering a 
variety of differing factors and combinations.   
                                                 
11  http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1880/sr1880.pdf  
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• Compared to many other HRA quantification methods, ATHEANA allows for the 
consideration of a much wider range of performance shaping factors and also does 
not require that these be treated as independent. This is important as the method seeks 
to identify any interactions which affect the weighting of the factors of their influence 
on a situation. 
Criticisms 
• A peer review of the original version of ATHEANA [95], raised a number of criticisms, 
some of which could be argued to apply to the version described in Barriere et al 
[92]. Some significant critical points made by reviewers are that 
− the method is cumbersome and requires a large team; 
− the method is not described in sufficient detail that one could be sure that different 
teams would produce the same results; 
− the quantification method is weak. 
• The taxonomic approach used by ATHEANA has been criticised: in particular the 
notion error forcing [96].  
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Cognitive Reliability and Error Analysis Method (CREAM) 
CREAM [26] is a technique used in HRA for the purposes of evaluating the probability of a 
human error occurring throughout the completion of a specific task.  From such analyses 
measures can then be taken to reduce the likelihood of errors occurring within a system 
and therefore lead to an improvement in the overall levels of safety.  There exist three 
primary reasons for conducting an HRA; error identification, error quantification and error 
reduction. HRA techniques have been utilised in a range of industries including 
healthcare, engineering, nuclear, transportation and business; each technique has varying 
uses within different disciplines. 
CREAM is a second generation HRA method.  Compared to many other methods, it takes a 
very different approach to modelling human reliability.  There are two versions of the 
technique, the basic and the extended version, both of which have in common two 
primary features; ability to identify the importance of human performance in a given 
context and a helpful cognitive model and associated framework, usable for both 
prospective and retrospective analysis.  Prospective analysis allows likely human errors 
to be identified while retrospective analysis quantifies errors that have already occurred. 
The concept of cognition is included in the model through use of four basic ‘control 
modes’ which identify differing levels of control that an operator has in a given context 
and the characteristics which highlight the occurrence of distinct conditions.  The control 
modes which may occur are as follows: 
• Scrambled control: the choice of the forthcoming action is unpredictable or 
haphazard.  The situation in question may be portraying rapid alterations in 
unexpected ways thus eliminating the operator’s ability or opportunity to make 
deductions about the next action required.     
• Opportunistic control: the next action is determined by superficial characteristics of 
the situation, possibly through habit or similarity matching.  The situation is 
characterised by lack of planning and this may possibly be due to the lack of available 
time.   
• Tactical control: performance typically follows planned procedures while some ad 
hoc deviations are still possible.   
• Strategic control: plentiful time is available to consider actions to be taken in the light 
of wider objectives to be fulfilled and within the given context.  
The particular control mode determines the level of reliability that can be expected in a 
particular setting and this is in turn determined by the collective characteristics of the 
relevant Common Performance Conditions (CPCs). 
Background 
CREAM was developed by Eric Hollnagel in 1998 following an analysis of the methods 
for HRA already in place.  It is the most widely utilised second generation HRA technique 
and is based on 3 primary areas of work;  task analysis, opportunities for reducing errors 
and possibility to consider human performance with regards to overall safety of a system. 
The aim of utilising this methodology is to assist an analyst to: 
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• identify work, actions or tasks within the system which necessitate or essentially 
depend on human thinking and which are therefore vulnerable to variations in their 
level of reliability;  
• identify the surrounding conditions in which the cognition of these situations may be 
reduced and therefore determine what actions may lead to a probable risk; 
• compile an evaluation from the assessment of the various outcomes of human 
performance and their effect on system safety – this can then be utilised as part of the 
Probability Risk Assessment (PRA); 
• make suggestions as to how identified error producing conditions may be improved 
and therefore of how the system’s reliability can be enhanced whilst also reducing 
risk.   
Methodology 
1. Task Analysis.  The basic method adopted by the CREAM technique provides an 
immediate reliability interval based on an assessment of the given control mode, as 
highlighted by the figures provided in the table below.  As can be seen by the contents of 
the table, each of the specified control modes has an individual reliability level.  In the 
extended CREAM version, the control modes play the role of a weighting factor which 
scales a nominal failure probability associated to a given cognitive function failure.  This 
version of CREAM is intended to be used for the purposes of a more in depth analysis of 
human interactions. 
Control mode Reliability interval (probability of action failures) 
0.5 E-5 < p < 1.0 E-2 Strategic 
1.0 E-3 < p < 1.0 E-1 Tactical 
1.0 E-2 < p < 0.5 E-0 Opportunistic 
1.0 E-1 < p < 1.0 E-0 Scrambled 
Table Reliability intervals from [26]. 
2. Context description.  The intention of the basic CREAM method is to use it as a 
screening technique with the aim of identifying processes which require a deeper level of 
analysis; this analysis may then be carried out by the extended CREAM method.   
3. Specification of Initiating Events.  When using the basic CREAM method, a task 
analysis is conducted prior to further assessment.  CPCs are assessed according to the 
descriptors, given in the table below, in order to judge their expected effect on 
performance.   
CPC name Level/descriptors Expected effect 
on performance 
reliability 
Adequacy of organisation Very efficient Improved  
 Efficient Not significant 
 Inefficient Reduced 
 Deficient Reduced 
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CPC name Level/descriptors Expected effect 
on performance 
reliability 
Working conditions Advantageous Improved  
 Compatible Not significant 
 Incompatible Reduced 
Adequacy of MMI and operational support Supportive Improved  
 Adequate Not significant 
 Tolerable Not significant 
 Inappropriate Reduced 
Availability of procedures/ plans Appropriate Improved  
 Acceptable Not significant 
 Inappropriate Reduced 
Number of simultaneous goals Fewer than capacity Not significant 
 Matching current capacity Not significant 
 More than capacity Reduced 
Available time Adequate Improved  
 Temporarily inadequate Not significant 
 Continuously inadequate Reduced 
Time of day (circadian rhythm) Day-time (adjusted) Not significant 
 Night-time (unadjusted) Reduced 
Adequacy of training and expertise Adequate, high experience Improved  
 
Adequate, limited 
experience Not significant 
 Inadequate Reduced 
Crew collaboration quality Very efficient Improved  
 Efficient Not significant 
 Inefficient Not significant 
 Deficient Reduced 
Table Common Performance Conditions (CPCs) 
4. Error Prediction.  The assessments of the CPCs then require to be adjusted according to 
some specified rules in order to take account of synergistic effects.  The matrix above 
would be considered in the context of the situation under assessment and by this means 
the previously considered initiating events are reviewed with respect to how they could 
potentially lead to the occurrence of an error.  The rows of the matrix identify the 
possible outcomes while the columns show the precursors.  The analyst then has the task 
of identifying the columns for which all the rows have been similarly classified into the 
same group according to the column headings.   
Predicting the possible outcomes for each of the rows should be done until there are no 
remaining possible paths.  Each of the identified errors requires to be noted along with 
the causes and the outcomes. 
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5. Finally, a simple count is performed of the number of CPCs that are causing an 
improvement in reliability and those which are reducing it.  On the basis of this number 


















Figure Allocation of probable control modes according to CPCs – each section displays the relation 
between the CPC score and control modes.  The x coordinate represents the number of reduced 
influence indexes and the y coordinate is the number of improved influence indexes. 
6. The extended version of the CREAM methodology operates in a slightly different 
manner.  Following the initial task analysis, a refinement is then provided in terms of the 
cognitive activities which are involved in the considered task (classified as co-ordinate, 
communicate, compare, etc).  To these activities a Contextual Control Model (COCOM) 
function (observation, interpretation, planning and execution) is ascribed (following a 
table provided) so that a cognitive demand profile may be established.  
7. Following this stage, the probable cognitive function failures are identified, based on a 
knowledge of the specific tasks, yet following a set of generic cognitive function failures 
associated to the COCOM functions.  Each of these generic failures is associated with a 
nominal probability which is based on a table given in CREAM. However these 
probabilities are adjusted depending on the particular control mode.    
Hence in the extended version of the CREAM methodology the control mode acts in the 
role of a Performance Shaping Factor with the task of performing adjustments to a 
nominal probability.  
Provided below is a simplified diagrammatic representation of all the stages involved in 
the complete CREAM methodology. 
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Worked example 
Context.  The basic example that is provided below concerns the task of ‘restarting a 
furnace following a system trip’. 
The following figure illustrates the hierarchical task analysis carried out for the task. 
 
O. Warm up 
furnace  
Plan O: Do in order 
 
O.1. Prepare 
plant and services 
O.2. Start air 
blower 
O.3. Start oil 
pump 
O.4. Heat oil to 
8000 C  
 
Plan O.1: Do in any order 
 
O.1.1. Ensure 
plant is ready  
O.1.2. Ensure gas-oil 
is available 
O.1.3 Ensure O2 analysis 
system is working  
 
Plan O.4: Raise temperature to 8000 C while monitoring O2 and ∆T 
 
O.4.1. Increase temperature 





O.4.4. Switch furnace 
to automatic  
 
The overall task is made up of four basic tasks, which are further completed by carrying 
out a number of sub-tasks.  First level tasks are required to be performed in the given 
sequence while the tasks on sub level two can be carried out in any order.  Finally the 
lowest level tasks are conducted as necessary in a repetitive manner. 
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Assumptions.  In this example, a number of assumptions should be noted in order to aid 
understanding.  It is assumed that the warm-up task does not have any procedural support 
nor is it one that has been trained in detail.   
Required Inputs.  From study of the task analysis, it is then possible to identify the 
necessary activities of the overall task that must be carried out.  
This involves assessing the work conditions under which the task in question is 
performed.  These are judged and rated on a scale as can be seen in the table provided 
below: 
CPC name Evaluation
The quality of the support and resources provided by the organisation for the task or 
work being performed.  This includes communication systems, Safety Management 




Descriptors   Very efficient/ Efficient/ Inefficient/ Deficient  
The conditions under which the work takes place, such as ambient lighting, glare on 
screens, noise from alarms, interruptions from the task etc. 
Working conditions 
 
Descriptors   Advantageous/Compatible/Incompatible
The quality of the MMI and/or specific operational support provided for operators. The 
MMI includes control panels, workstations, and operational support provided by 
specifically designed decision aids 
Adequacy of MMI and 
operational support 
 
Descriptors   Supportive/Adequate/Tolerable/Inappropriate 
The availability of prepared guidance for the work to be carried out, including 




Descriptors   Appropriate/Acceptable/Inappropriate
The number of tasks or goals operators must attend to.  Since the number of goals is 




Descriptors   Fewer than capacity/Matching current capacity/More than capacity 
The time available to complete the work; or the general level of time pressure for the 
task and the situation type. How well the task is synchronised to the process 
dynamics. 
Available Time 
Descriptors   Adequate/Temporarily inadequate/Continuously inadequate 
The time at which the task is carried out, in particular whether the person is adjusted 
to the current time. 
Time of day (circadian 
rhythm) 
 
Descriptors   Day-time(adjusted)/Night-time (unadjusted) 
The level of readiness for the work as provided (by the organisation) through training 
and prior instruction. Includes familiarisation to new technology, refreshing old skills, 
etc. as well as the level of operational experience 
Adequacy of training 
and preparation 
 
Descriptors   Adequate, high experience/ Adequate, limited experience/ Inadequate 
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CPC name Evaluation
The quality of the collaboration between crew members, including the overlap 
between the official and unofficial structure, the level of trust, and the general social 
climate among crew members. 
Adequacy of training 
and preparation 
 
Descriptors   Very efficient/Efficient/ Inefficient/ Deficient 
Method.   In order to calculate the combined CPC score, the assigned ratings of the CPCs 
are entered in the table as shown in step 3 of the methodology section. Using certain rules 
[26] an assessment is made as to whether it is necessary to adjust the CPCs.  In this 
example this is not necessary.  Therefore the combined CPC score for this example is [3, 
5, 1].  This is interpreted as the CPCs pointing to reduced performance reliability, 4 CPCs 
indicate that there is no significant influence and one CPC suggests an improved 
performance reliability. 
Result.  By determining the most likely control mode for the example, the general action 
failure probability can also thus be identified.  Referring to the graphical display in 
Figure 1, the result for this example is that the operator is expected to be in an 
opportunistic control mode. This adequately relates to the assumption provided earlier 
that the operator under consideration has only slight experience or training for the task 
and there is insufficient support for the operations involved in the task.  It may therefore 
be suggested that the operator may task a ‘try and test’ approach, particularly for 
complicated tasks such as increasing the temperature under controlled conditions.   
The last stage of the process is to determine the probability interval for the expected 
control mode, the opportunistic control mode.  Referring to the table of reliability 
intervals on page 47, for this example the general action failure probability is within the 
range of   1.0 E-2 < p < 0.5 E-0.  As this is not regarded as an acceptable there is no clear 
and justified reason to continue with the analysis being undertaken. 
Advantages 
• The technique allows for the direct quantification of HEP. 
• It also allows the assessor using the CREAM method to specifically tailor the use of the 
technique to the contextual situation [97]. 
• The resultant model is highly integrate-able into the primary safety process in use. 
• The technique uses the same principles for retrospective and predictive analyses [97]. 
• The approach is very concise, well structured and follows a well laid out system of 
procedure [97]. 
Criticisms 
• The technique requires a high level of resource use, including lengthy time periods 
for completion [97]. 
• CREAM also requires an initial expertise in the field of human factors in order to use 
the technique successfully and may therefore appear rather complex for an 
inexperienced user [97]. 
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• CREAM does not put forth potential means by which the identified errors can be 
reduced [97]. 
• The time required for application is very lengthy.  
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Human Cognitive Reliability Correlation (HCR) 
Human Cognitive Reliability Correlation (HCR) is a technique used in the field of HRA for 
the purposes of evaluating the probability of a human error occurring throughout the 
completion of a specific task.  From such analyses measures can then be taken to reduce 
the likelihood of errors occurring within a system and therefore lead to an improvement 
in the overall levels of safety.  There exist three primary reasons for conducting an HRA; 
error identification, error quantification and error reduction.  HRA techniques have been 
utilised in a range of industries including healthcare, engineering, nuclear, transportation 
and business sector; each technique has varying uses within different disciplines. 
HCR is based on the premise that an operator’s likelihood of success or failure in a time-
critical task is dependent on the cognitive process used to make the critical decisions that 
determine the outcome.  Three PSFs – operator experience, stress level, and quality of 
operator/plant interface – also influence the average (median) time taken to perform the 
task.  Combining these factors enables “response-time” curves to be calibrated and 
compared to the available time to perform the task.  Using these curves, the analyst can 
then estimate the likelihood that an operator will take the correct action, as required by a 
given stimulus (e.g. pressure warning signal), within the available time window.  The 
relationship between these normalised times and HEPs is based on simulator experimental 
data. 
Background 
HCR is a psychology/cognitive modelling approach to HRA developed by Hannaman et al. 
[98] in 1984. The method uses Rasmussen’s idea of rule-based, skill-based, and 
knowledge-based decision making to determine the likelihood of failing a given task 
[99], as well as considering the PSFs of operator experience, stress and interface quality. 
The database underpinning this methodology was originally developed through the use of 
nuclear power-plant simulations due to a requirement for a method by which nuclear 
operating reliability could be quantified. 
HCR Methodology 
The HCR methodology is broken down into a sequence of steps as given below: 
1. The first step is for the analyst to determine the situation in need of a human 
reliability assessment.  It is then determined whether this situation is governed by 
rule-based, skill-based or knowledge-based decision making.   
2. From the relevant literature, the appropriate HCR mathematical model or graphical 
curve is then selected.   
3. The median response time to perform the task in question is thereafter determined.  
This is commonly done by expert judgement, operator interview or simulator 
experiment.  In some literature, this time is denoted T1/2 and sometimes referred to as 
the nominal response time. 
4. The median T1/2 is adjusted to make it specific to the situational context.  This is done 
by means of the PSF coefficients K1 (operator experience), K2 (stress level) and K3 
(quality of operator/plant interface) given in the literature and using the following 
formula: 
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T1/2adjusted  = T1/2 nominal × (1 + K1)(1 + K2)(1 + K3) 
Performance improving PSFs (e.g. worker experience, low stress) will take negative 
values resulting in quicker times, whilst performance inhibiting PSFs (e.g. poor 
interface) will increase this adjusted median time. 
5. For the action being assessed, the time window (T) should then be calculated, which 
is the time in which the operator must take action to resolve correctly the situation. 
6. To obtain the non-response probability, the time window (T) is divided by T1/2, the 
median time.  This gives the Normalised Time Value. The probability of non-
response can then be found by referring to the HCR curve selected earlier. 
This non-response probability may then be integrated into a fuller HRA; a complete HEP 
can only be reached in conjunction with other methods as non-response is not the sole 
source of human error. 
Worked Example  
The following example is taken from Human Factors in Reliability Group [87] in which 
Hannaman describes analysis of failure to SCRAM manually in a Westinghouse PWR.   
Context.  The example concerns a model in which failures occurs to SCRAM manually in 
a Westinghouse PWR.  The primary task to be carried out involves inserting control rods 
into the core.  This can be further broken down into two sub-tasks which involve namely 
detection and action, which are in turn based upon recognising and identifying an 
automatic trip failure  
Assumptions.  Given that there exists the assumption that there is simply one option in 
the procedures and that within training procedures optional actions are disregarded, the 
likelihood that a reactor trip failure will be incorrectly diagnosed is minimal.    
It is also assumed that the behaviour of the operating crew under consideration is skill-
based; the reactor trip event which takes place is not part of a routine, however the 
behaviour adopted by the crew when the event is taking place is nevertheless recognised.  
Moreover, there are well set procedures which determine how the event should be 
conducted and these are assumed comprehended and practised to required standards in 
training sessions.  
The average time taken by the crew to complete the task is 25 seconds.  The average 
completion times for the respective subtasks are set as 10 seconds for detection of the 
failure and 15 seconds for taking subsequent action to remedy the situation.   
Method.  The PSFs (K factor) judged to influence the situation are assessed to be in the 
following categories:  
• operator experience is “well trained” 
• stress level is “potential emergency” 
• quality of interface is “good” 
The various K factors are assigned the following values:  
K1 = 0.0 
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K2 = 0.28  
K3 = 0.0 
Referring to the equation in Step 4 above, the product is therefore equal to the value of 
1.28.  In response, the average tasks times are altered from 10 and 15 seconds to 12.8 and 
19.2 seconds respectively.  Given that the PSFs are identical for both of the given sub-
tasks, it is therefore possible to sum the median response times to give a total of 32 
seconds, adjusting the figure for stress, compared to a previous total of 25 seconds.   
The time window (T) to perform the task as part of the overall system is given as 79 
seconds.  This time is derived from a study conducted by Westinghouse in which it was 
discovered that the crew had approximately 79 seconds to complete the task of inserting 
the control rod to the reactor and then to shut the reactor down in order to inhibit over-
pressuring within the main operating system.    
Results/Outcome.  Consulting the graphical curve central to the technique, the normalised 
time for the task can thus be established.  It is determined by the division of 79 seconds 
and 32 seconds, giving a result of 2.47 seconds.  Identifying this point on the abscissa 
(the HCR curve model) provides a non response probability of  2.9 x 10-3; this can also be 
checked for validation utilising the formula:-  
PRT (79) = exp – [ (79/32) – 0.7 / 0.407] 1.2
PRT (79) = 2.9 x 10 -3/ demand 
where PRT (T) equals the probability of non success within the system time window T. 
Provided below is the graphical solution for the assessment using the HCR technique: 
 
Advantages of HCR  
• The approach explicitly models the time-dependent nature of HRA [87]. 
• It is a fairly quick technique to carry out and has a relative ease of use [87]. 
• The three modes of decision-making, knowledge-based, skill-based and rule-based 
are all modelled [87]. 
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Disadvantages of HCR 
• The HEP produced by HCR is not complete; it calculates the probability that a system 
operator will fail to diagnose and process information, make a decision and act within 
the time available.  It does not give any regard to misdiagnoses or rule violations [87]. 
• The same probability curves are used to model non-detection and slow response 
failures. These are very different processes, and it is unlikely that identical curves 
could model their behaviour.  Furthermore, it is uncertain as to whether such curves 
could be applied to situations in which detection failures or processing difficulties are 
the primary dominating factors of influence [87]. 
• The rules for judging Knowledge-based, Skill-based and Rule-based behaviour are 
not exhaustive.  Assigning the wrong behaviour to a task can mean differences of up 
to two orders of magnitude in the HEP [87].  
• The method is very sensitive to changes in the estimate of the median time.  
Therefore, this estimate must be very accurate otherwise the estimation in the HEP 
will suffer as a consequence [87]. 
• It is highly resource intensive to collect all the required data for the HCR 
methodology, particularly due to the necessity of evaluation for all new situations 
which require an assessment [87].   
• There is no sense of output from the model that indicates in any way of how human 
reliability could be adjusted to allow for improvement or optimisation to meet 
required goals of performance [87].  
• Only three PSFs are included in the methodology; there are several other PSFs that 
could affect performance which are unaccounted for.  
• The model is relatively insensitive to PSF changes as opposed to, for example, time 
parameter changes [87].  
• As the HCR correlation was originally developed for use within the nuclear industry, it 
is not immediately applicable to situations out-with this domain [87].  
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Human Error Assessment and Reduction Technique (HEART)   
Human Error Assessment and Reduction Technique (HEART) is a technique used in the 
field of HRA for the purposes of evaluating the probability of a human error occurring 
throughout the completion of a specific task.  From such analyses measures can then be 
taken to reduce the likelihood of errors occurring within a system and therefore lead to an 
improvement in the overall levels of safety.  There exist three primary reasons for 
conducting an HRA; error identification, error quantification and error reduction.  HRA 
techniques have been utilised in a range of industries including healthcare, engineering, 
nuclear, transportation and business sector; each technique has varying uses within 
different disciplines. 
The HEART method is based upon the principle that every time a task is performed there 
is a possibility of failure and that the probability of this is affected by one or more EPCs – 
for instance: distraction, tiredness, cramped conditions etc. – to varying degrees.  Factors 
which have a significant effect on performance are of greatest interest.  These conditions 
can then be applied to a “best-case-scenario” estimate of the failure probability under 
ideal conditions then to obtain a final error chance.  This figure assists in communication 
of error likelihoods with the wider risk analysis or safety case.  By forcing consideration 
of the EPCs potentially affecting a given procedure, HEART also provides a means of 
considering the impact of possible risk reduction measures. 
Background 
HEART was developed by Williams in 1986 [100].  It is a first generation HRA technique, 
and is still widely used throughout the UK.  The method essentially takes into 
consideration a range of important factors which may negatively affect human 
performance of a task. Each of these factors is then independently quantified to obtain an 
overall HEP, depending on each of the factors.   
HEART Methodology  
1. The first stage of the process is to identify the full range of sub-tasks that a system 
operator would be required to complete within a given task.   
2. Once this task description has been constructed a nominal human unreliability score 
for the particular task is then determined, usually by consulting local experts.  Based 
around this calculated point, a 5th – 95th percentile confidence range is established.    
3. The EPCs, which are potentially relevant for the given situation, are then considered 
and the extent to which each EPC applies to the task in question is discussed and 
agreed, again with local experts.   
4. A final estimate of the HEP is then calculated using the EPC scores. 
Worked Example [91] 
Context.  A reliability engineer has the task of assessing the probability of a plant 
operator failing to carry out the task of isolating a plant bypass route as required by 
procedure.  However, the operator is fairly inexperienced in fulfilling this task and 
therefore does not always follow the correct procedure; the individual is therefore 
unaware of the hazards created when the task is carried out incorrectly.   
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Assumptions.  There are various assumptions that should be considered in the context of 
the situation:  
• the operator is working a shift in which he is in his 7th hour. 
• there is talk circulating the plant that it is due to close down 
• it is possible for the operator’s work to be checked at any time 
• local management aim to keep the plant open despite a desperate need for re-vamping 
and maintenance work; if the plant is closed down for a short period, if the problems 
are unattended, there is a risk that it may remain closed permanently.  
Method.  A representation of this situation using the HEART methodology would be done 
as follows: 
• From the relevant tables it can be established that the type of task in this situation is 
of the type (F) which is defined as ‘Restore or shift a system to original or new state 
following procedures, with some checking’.  This task type has the proposed nominal 
human unreliability value of 0.03. 
• Other factors to be included in the calculation are provided in the table below: 






Inexperience × 3 0.4 (3.0-1) × 0.4 + 1 = 1.8 
Opposite technique × 6 1.0 (6.0-1) × 1.0 + 1 = 6.0 
Risk Misperception × 4 0.8 (4.0-1) × 0.8 + 1 = 3.4 
Conflict of 
Objectives 
× 2.5 0.8 (2.5-1) × 0.8 + 1 = 2.2 
Low Morale × 1.2 0.6 (1.2-1) × 0.6 + 1 = 1.12 
Result.  The final calculation for the normal likelihood of failure can therefore be 
formulated as: 
0.003 × 1.8 × 6.0 × 3.4 × 2.2 × 1.12 = 0.27 
Advantages of HEART   
• HEART is very quick and straightforward to use [87]. 
• The technique provides the user with useful suggestions as to how to reduce the 
occurrence of errors12. 
• It provides ready linkage between Ergonomics and Process Design, with reliability 
improvement measures being a direct conclusion which can be drawn from the 
assessment procedure. 
                                                 
12  http://www2.hf.faa.gov/workbenchtools/default.aspx?rPage=Tooldetails&toolID=110 
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• It is highly flexible and applicable in a wide-range of areas which contributes to the 
popularity of its use [87]. 
Disadvantages of HEART 
• The main criticism of the HEART technique is that the EPC data has never been fully 
released and it is therefore not possible to review fully the validity of Williams EPC 
data base.  Kirwan has dome some empirical validation on HEART and found that it 
had “a reasonable level of accuracy” but was not necessarily better or worse than the 
other techniques in the study [27, 83, 84].  Further theoretical validation is thus 
required [91].  
• HEART relies to a high extent on expert opinion, first in the point probabilities of 
human error, and also in the assessed proportion of EPC effect.  The final HEPs are 
therefore sensitive to both optimistic and pessimistic assessors 
• The interdependence of EPCs is not modelled in this methodology, with the HEPs 
being multiplied directly. This assumption of independence does not necessarily hold 
in a real situation [91]. 
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Influence Diagrams Approach (IDA) 
Influence Diagrams Approach (IDA) is a technique used in the field of HRA for the 
purpose of evaluating the probability of a human error occurring during the completion of 
a specific task.  From such analyses measures can then be taken to reduce the likelihood 
of errors occurring within a system and therefore lead to an improvement in the overall 
levels of safety.  There exist three primary reasons for conducting an HRA; error 
identification, error quantification and error reduction.  HRA techniques have been utilised 
in a range of industries including healthcare, engineering, nuclear, transportation and 
business sector; each technique has varying uses within different disciplines. 
An Influence Diagram (ID) is essentially a graphical representation of the probabilistic 
dependencies between PSFs, the factors which influence probability of failure in the 
performance of a task.  The approach originates from the field of decision analysis and 
uses expert judgement to formulate and often to quantify the models.  The role of the ID is 
both to depict these influences and the nature of the interrelationships in a 
comprehensible format, and to provide a method of calculating failure probability.  In this 
way, the diagram may be used to represent the shared beliefs of a group of experts on the 
outcome of a particular human action and the factors that may or may not influence that 
outcome.  For each of the identified influences quantitative values are calculated, which 
are then used to derive final HEP estimates. 
Background 
IDA is a decision analysis based framework which is developed through eliciting expert 
judgement, usually in group workshops. Unlike other first generation HRA, IDA explicitly 
considers the inter-dependency of operator and organisational PSFs. The IDA approach 
was first outlined by Howard and Matheson [101, 102], and then developed specifically 
for the nuclear industry by Phillips et al [103]. 
IDA Methodology 
The IDA methodology is conducted in a series of 10 steps as follows: 
1. Describe all relevant conditioning events 
Experts who posses sufficient knowledge of the situation under evaluation form a 
group.  The chosen individuals include a range of experts - typically those with first 
hand experience in the operational context under consideration – such as plant 
supervisors, reliability assessors, human factor specialists and designers.  The group 
collectively assesses and gradually develops a representation of the most significant 
influences which will affect the success of the situation.  The resultant diagram is 
useful in that it identifies both immediate and implied influences of the considered 
factors with regards their effect on the situation under assessment and upon one 
another. 
2. Refine the target event definition 
The event which is the basis of the assessment must be defined as tightly as possible. 
3. Balance of Evidence 
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The next stage is to select a middle-level event in the situation and using each of the 
bottom level influences, assess the weight of evidence, also known as the ‘balance of 
evidence’; this represents expert analysis of the likelihood that a specific state of 
influence or combination of the various influences is existent within the considered 
situation. 
4. Assess the weight of evidence for this middle-level influence, which is conditional on 
bottom-level influences 
5. Repeat 3 and 4 for the remaining middle-level and bottom-level influences 
These three steps are conducted in the aim of determining the extent to which the 
influences exist in the process, alone and in different combinations, and their 
conditional effects. 
6. Assess probabilities of target event conditional on middle-level influences 
7. Calculate the unconditional probability of target event and unconditional weight of 
evidence of middle-level influences.  For the various combinations of influences that 
have been considered, the experts identify direct estimates of the likelihood of either 
success or failure. 
8. Compare these results to the holistic judgements of HEPs by the assessors. Revise if 
necessary to reduce discrepancies. 
At this stage the probabilities derived from the use of the technique are compared to 
holistic estimates from the experts, which have been derived through an APJ process. 
Discrepancies are discussed and resolved within the group as required. 
9. Repeat above steps until assessors are finished refining their judgements 
The above steps are iterated, in which all experts share opinions, highlight new 
aspects to the problem and revise the initially made assessments of the situation.  The 
process is deemed complete when all participants reach a consensus that any 
misgivings about the discrepancies are resolved. 
10. Perform sensitivity analyses 
If individual experts remain to be unsure of the discrepancies about the assessments 
which have been made, then sensitivity analysis can be used to determine the extent 
to which individual influence assessments affect the target event HEP.  Conducting a 
cost-benefit analysis is also possible at this stage of the process.    
Example 
The diagram below depicts an influence diagram which can be applied to any human 
reliability assessment [87]. 
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This diagram was originally developed for use in the HRA of a scenario within the setting 
of a nuclear power situation.  The diagram depicts the direct influences of each of the 
factors on the situation under consideration as well as providing as indication as to the 
way in which some of the factors affect each other.  There are 7 first level influences on 
the outcome of the high level task, numbered 1 to 7.  Each of these describes an aspect of 
the task under assessment, which is modelled as being in one of two states. 
• The design of the task is judged to be either good or bad 
• The meaningfulness of the procedures involved in the completion of the task are 
simply meaningful or not meaningful 
• Operators either possess a role in the task that is or is not of primary importance  
• For the purposes of completing the considered task, they may or not be a formation of 
teams of individuals 
• The stress levels associated with the task can affect performance and render 
individuals either functional or not functional 
• The surrounding work ethic and environment in which the task takes place will 
provide either a good level of morale or a poor motivation level 
• Competence of the individuals who are responsible for carrying out the task is either 
of a high level or a low level 
Differing combinations of these first level influences affect the state of those on the 
second level. 
• The quality of information, which can either be classed as good or bad, is dependent 
upon the meaningfulness of the procedures of the task and the task design. 
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• The organisation, whether it is assessed as either requisite or not requisite, is 
determined by the role of operations functions in completing the task, the 
meaningfulness of the procedures and whether or not teams are formed to complete 
the task 
• The personal aspect of the task can be judged as either favourable for successful 
completion or unfavourable.  The way in which this is assessed is dependent on 
competence level of the concerned individuals, stress levels present, 
morale/motivation levels of the individuals and whether or not teams are formed to 
complete the task. 
By assessing the state of the second level influences, the quality of information, 
organisation and personal factors, the overall likelihood of either success or failure of the 
task can be calculated by means of conditional probability calculations. 
Advantages of IDA 
• Dependence between PSFs is explicitly acknowledged and modelled [87] 
• It can be used at any task “level”, i.e. it can be used in a strategic overview or in a 
very fine breakdown of a task element [87]. 
• Data requirements are low [87]. 
• PSFs are precisely defined and their influence is explored in depth [87]. 
• PSFs and other influence creating error producing conditions are prioritised and if 
desired, the less significant ones may be ignored  
• Sensitivity analysis is possible with use of this technique [87]. 
• It is possible to generate high amounts of qualitative data through the group 
discussion process 
Disadvantages of IDA 
• Building IDAs is highly resource-intensive in terms of organising and supporting an 
extensive group session involving a suitable range of experts [87]. 
• Eliciting HEPs requires further research with regards to their accuracy and 
justification [87]. 
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Success Likelihood Index Method (SLIM) 
Success Likelihood Index Method (SLIM) is a technique used in the HRA field for the 
purpose of evaluating the probability of a human error occurring during the completion of 
a specific task.  From such analyses measures can then be taken to reduce the likelihood 
of errors occurring within a system and therefore lead to an improvement in the overall 
levels of safety.  There exist three primary reasons for conducting an HRA; error 
identification, error quantification and error reduction.  HRA techniques have been utilised 
in a range of industries including healthcare, engineering, nuclear, transportation and 
business sector; each technique has varying uses within different disciplines. 
SLIM is a decision-analytic approach to HRA which uses expert judgement to quantify 
PSFs; factors concerning the individuals, environment or task, which have the potential to 
either positively or negatively affect performance e.g. available task time.  Such factors 
are used to derive a Success Likelihood Index (SLI), a form of preference index, which is 
calibrated against existing data to derive a final HEP.  Significant PSFs for the context 
under study are selected by experts.    
The technique consists of two modules: Multi-Attribute Utility Decomposition (MAUD) 
which scales the relative success likelihood in performing a range of tasks; and 
Systematic Approach to the Reliability Assessment of Humans (SARAH) which calibrates 
these success scores with tasks with known HEP values to provide an overall figure. 
Background 
SLIM was developed by Embrey et al [104] for use within the US nuclear industry.  By 
use of this method, relative success likelihoods are established for a range of tasks, and 
then calibrated using a logarithmic transformation.  
SLIM Methodology 
The SLIM methodology breaks down into ten steps of which steps 1-7 are involved in 
SLIM-MAUD and 8-10 are SLIM-SARAH. 
1. Definition of situations and subsets 
Upon selection of a relevant panel of experts who will carry out the assessment, these 
individuals are  provided with as fully detailed a task description as possible, the  
group of individuals designated to perform each task and further factors which are 
likely to influence the success of each of these.  An in-depth description is a critical 
aspect of the procedure in order to ensure that all members of the assessment group 
share a common understanding of the given task.  This may be further advanced 
through a group discussion prior to the commencement of the panel session to 
ascertain of consensus.  Following this discussion, the tasks under consideration are 
then classified depending upon the homogeneity of the PSFs that have an effect on 
each.  Subsets are thus defined by those tasks which have common specific PSFs and 
possibly also by their weighting within a certain sub-group; this weighting is only an 
approximation at this stage of the process. 
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2. Elicitation of PSFs 
Random sets of 3 tasks are presented to experts from which they are required to 
compare one against the other two and subsequently identify an aspect in which the 
highlighted task differs from the remaining two; this dissimilarity should be a 
characteristic which affects the probability of successful task completion.   The 
experts are then asked to highlight the low and high end-points of the identified PSF, 
i.e. the optimality of the PSF in the context of the given task.  For example the PSF 
may be Time Pressure and therefore the end points of the scale would perhaps be 
“High level of pressure” to “Low level of pressure”.  Other possible PSFs may be 
stress levels, task complexity or degree of teamwork required.  The purpose of this 
stage is to identify those PSFs which are most prevalent in affecting the tasks as 
opposed to eliciting all the possible influencing factors.  
3. Rating the Tasks on the PSFs 
The endpoints of each individual PSF, as identified by the expert, are then assigned 
the values 1 and 9 on a linear scale.  Using this scale, the expert is required to assign 
to each task a rating, between the two end points, which accurately reflects, using 
their judgement, the conditions occurring in the task in question.  It is optimal to 
consider each factor in turn so that the judgements made are independent from the 
influence of other factors which otherwise may affect opinion. 
4. Ideal Point Elicitation and Scaling Calculations 
The “ideal” rating for each PSF is then selected on the scale constructed.  The ideal is 
the point at which the PSF least degrades performance – for instance both low and 
high time pressure may contribute to increasing the chance of failure.  The MAUD 
software then rescales all other ratings made on the scale in terms of their distance 
from this ideal point, with the closest being assigned as a 1 and the furthest from this 
point as a 0.  This is done for all PSFs until the experts are agreed that the list of PSFs 
is exhausted and that all the scale positions identified are correctly positioned.   
5. Independence Checks 
Using the figures which represent the relative importance of each task and their rating 
on the relevant scale, these are multiplied to produce a SLI figure for each task.  To 
improve the validity of the process it is necessary to confirm that each of the scales in 
use are independent to ensure no overlap or double counting in the overall calculation 
of the index.   
To help carry out this validation task, MAUD software checks for correlations between 
the experts’ scoring on the different scales; if the scale ratings indicate a high 
correlation, the experts are consulted to reveal whether they agree in their meanings 
of the ratings on the two scales which are showing similarities.  If this situation 
occurs, the experts are asked to define a new scale which will be a combination of the 
meaning of the two individually correlated scales.  If the correlation is not significant 
then the scales are treated as independent; in this case, the concerned facilitator is 
required to make an informed decision as to whether or not the PSFs showing 
similarities are actually similar and should therefore ensure that a strong justification 
is explainable for the final decision.  
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6. Weighting Procedure 
This stage of the process concentrates on eliciting the emphasis required to be 
reflected in the weights on each of the PSFs in terms of the influence on the success of 
a task.  This is done by enquiring, with the experts, the likelihood of success between 
pairs of tasks while considering two previously identified PSFs.  By noting where the 
experts’ opinion is changed, the weighting of the effect of each PSF on the task 
success can thus be inferred.  To enhance the accuracy of the outcome, this stage 
should be carried out in an iterative manner.    
7. Calculation of the SLI 
The SLI for each task is deduced using the following formula: 





- SLIj is the SLI for task j 
- Wi is the importance weight for the ith PSF 
- Rij is the scaled rating of task j on the ith PSF 
- x represents the number of PSFs considered. 
These SLIs are estimates of the probability with which different types of error may 
occur.   
8. Conversion of SLIs to probabilities 
The SLIs previously calculated require to be transformed to HEPs as they are only 
relative measures of the likelihood of success of each of the considered tasks. 
The relationship 
Log P = a SLI + b 
is assumed to exist between SLIs and HEPs.  P is the probability of success and a and 
b are constants; a and b are calculated from the SLIs of two tasks where the HEP has 
already been established. 
9. Uncertainty Bound Analysis 
Uncertainty bounds can be estimated using expert judgement methods such as 
Absolute Probability Judgement (APJ). 
10. Use of SLIM-SARAH for Cost-Effectiveness Analyses 
As SLIM evaluates HEPs as a function of the PSFs, considered to be the major drivers 
in human reliability, it is possible to perform sensitivity analysis by modifying the 
scores of the PSFs.  By considering the PSFs which may be altered, the degree to 
which they can be changed and the importance of the PSFs, it is possible to conduct a 
cost-benefit analysis to determine how worthwhile suggested improvements may be 
i.e. what-if analysis, the optimal means by which the calculated HEPs can be reduced. 
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Worked Example  
The following example, based on [105], provides a good illustration of how the SLIM 
methodology is used in practice in the field of HRA.   
Context.  In this context an operator is responsible for the task of de-coupling a filling 
hose from a chemical road tanker.  There exists the possibility that the operator may 
forget to close a valve located upstream of the filling hose, which is a crucial part of the 
procedure; if overlooked, this could result in adverse consequences, of greater effect to 
the operator in control.  The primary human error of concern in this situation is ‘failure to 
close V0204 prior to decoupling filling hose’.  The decoupling operation required to be 
conducted is a fairly easy task to carry out and does not require to be completed in 
conjunction with any further tasks; therefore is failure occurs it will have a catastrophic 
impact as opposed to displaying effects in a gradual manner.   
Required Inputs.  This technique also requires an ‘expert panel’ to carry out the HRA; the 
panel would be made up of for example two operators possessing approximately 10 years 
experience of the system, a human factors analyst and a reliability analyst who has 
knowledge of the system and possesses a degree of experience of operation.   
The panel of experts is requested to determine a set of PSFs which are applicable to the 
task in question within the context of the wider system; of these, the experts are then 
required to propose those PSFs, of the identified, which are the most important in the 
circumstances of the scenario.   
For this example, it is assumed that the panel put forth 5 main PSFs for consideration, 
which are believed to have the greatest effect on human performance of the task: training, 
procedures, feedback, perceived risk and time pressure.  
Method.  PSF rating.  Considering the situation within the context of the task under 
assessment, the panel are asked to provide further possible human errors which may 
occur that have the potential of affecting performance e.g. mis-setting or ignoring an 
alarm.  For each of these, the experts are required to establish the degree to which each is 
either optimal or sub-optimal for the task under assessment, working on a scale from 1 to 
9, with the latter being the optimal rating.  For the 3 human errors which have been 
identified, the ratings decided for each are provided below: 
Errors training procedures feedback perceived risk time 
VO2O4 open 6 5 2 9 6 
Alarm mis-set 5 3 2 7 4 
Alarm ignored 4 5 7 7 2 
PSF weighting.  Were each of the identified human errors of equal importance, it would 
then be possible to obtain the summation of each row of ratings and come to the 
conclusion that the row with the lowest total rating- in this case it would be alarm mis-
set- was the most probable to occur.  In this context, as is most often the case, the experts 
are in agreement that the PSFs given above are not of equal weighting.  Perceived risk and 
feedback are deemed to be of greatest importance, twice as much as training and 
procedures, which are considered to be one and a half times more important than the 
factor of time.  The time factor is of considered of minimal importance in this context as 
the task is routine and is therefore not limited by time.   
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The importance of each factor can be observed through the allocated weighting, as 
provided below.  Note that they have been normalised to sum to unity.   
 PSF Importance 
 Perceived risk 0.30 
 Feedback 0.30 
 Training 0.15 
 Procedures 0.15 
 Time 0.10 
 SUM 1.00 
Using the figures for the scaled weighting of the PSFs and the weighting of their 
importance, it is now possible to calculate the SLI for the task under assessment.   
Weighting PSFs V0101 Alarm mis-set Alarm ignored 
 0.30 Feedback 0.60 0.60 2.10  
 0.30 Perc’d Risk 2.70 2.10 2.10   
 0.15 Training 0.90 0.75 0.60 
 0.15 Procedures 0.75 0.45 0.75 
 0.10 Time 0.60 0.40 0.20 
  SLI (total) 5.55 4.30 5.75 
From the results of the calculations, as the SLI for ‘alarm mis-set’ is the lowest, this 
suggests that this is the most probable error to occur throughout the completion of the 
task.   
However these SLI figures are not yet in the form of probabilities; they are only 
indications as to the likelihood by which the various errors may occur.  The SLIs 
determine the order in which the errors are most probable to occur; they do not delineate 
the absolute probabilities of the PSFs.  To convert the SLIs to HEPs, the SLI figures require 
to first be standardised; this can be done using the following formulation.   
Log10 (HEP) = a.SLI + b 
Result.  If the two tasks for which the HEPs are known are incorporated in the task set 
which is undergoing quantification then the equation parameters can be determined by 
using the method of simultaneous equations; using the result of this the unknown HEP 
values can thus be quantified.  In the example provided, were two additional tasks to be 
assessed e.g. A and B, which had HEP values of 0.5 and 10-4 respectively and SLIs 
respectively of 4.00 and 6.00, respectively, then the formulation would be:  
Log (HEP) = -1.85SLI + 7.1 
The final HEP values would thus be determined as  
V0204 = 0.0007 
Alarm mis-set = 0.14 
Alarm ignored = 0.0003 
Advantages of SLIM  
• The method has a sound basis in decision theory and a reasonably high level of 
theoretical validity [87]. 
S. French 69 19/1/2010 
Human Reliability Analysis 
• The technique is highly visible and auditable and is also sophisticated and well 
developed [87]. 
• Sensitivity analysis is relatively straightforward to execute 
• SLIM can be used to evaluate HEPs for discrete tasks as well as at a higher, more 
holistic level. 
• It is useful in allowing comprehensive cost benefit evaluations to be carried out [87]. 
Disadvantages of SLIM 
• Extensive use of expert judgement is required [87].  
• The method by which PSFs are selected is somewhat subjective and is considered to 
be unsuitable as the question is posed as to the means by which the PSFs suggested by 
the experts are judged to be reliable; why are the judges expected to have in depth 
knowledge of the affecting factors and details surrounding these [91].  
• SLIM is relatively resource-intensive to carry out compared to some other HRA 
methods. 
• The validity of the logarithmic transformation has not been established i.e. it requires 
some empirical and experimental justification. 
• The absolute HEPs depend on the two calibration events used to establish the linear 
scaling parameters. Hence errors in these two HEPs will induce systematic errors in 
the other calculated HEPs. 
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Tecnica Empirica Stima Errori Operatori (TESEO)  
Tecnica Empirica Stima Errori Operatori (TESEO) is a technique used in the field of HRA 
for the purposes of evaluating the probability of a human error occurring throughout the 
completion of a specific task.  From such analyses measures can then be taken to reduce 
the likelihood of errors occurring within a system and therefore lead to an improvement 
in the overall levels of safety.  There exist three primary reasons for conducting an HRA; 
error identification, error quantification and error reduction.  HRA techniques have been 
utilised in a range of industries including healthcare, engineering, nuclear, transportation 
and business sector; each technique has varying uses within different disciplines. 
This is a time based model which describes the probability of a system operator’s failure 
as a multiplicative function of 5 main factors.  These factors are as follows: 
1. K1:  The type of task to be executed  
2. K2:  The time available to the operator to complete the task  
3. K3: The operator’s level of experience/characteristics  
4. K4:  The operator’s state of mind  
5. K5:  The environmental and ergonomic conditions prevalent  
Using these figures, an overall HEP can be calculated with the formulation provided 
below:  
K1 × K2 × K3 × K4 × K5 
The specific value of each of the above functions can be obtained by consulting standard 
tables that take account of the method in which the HEP is derived.   
Background 
Developed in 1980 by Bello and Columbari [106], TESEO created with the intention of 
using it for the purpose of conducting HRA of process industries.  The methodology is 
relatively straightforward and is easy to use but is also limited; it is useful for quick 
overview HRA assessments as opposed to those which are highly detailed and in-depth.  
Within the field of HRA, there is a lack of theoretical foundation of the technique as is 
widely acknowledged throughout.     
TESEO Methodology 
When putting this technique into practice, it is necessary for the designated HRA assessor 
to thoroughly consider the task requiring assessment and therefore also consider the value 
for Kn that applies in the context.  Once this value has been decided upon, the tables, 
previously mentioned, are then consulted from which a related value for each of the 
identified factors is found in order to allow the HEP to be calculated.       
Worked Example 
Provided below is an example of how TESEO methodology can be used in practice; each 
of the stages of the process described above are worked through in order. 
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Context.   An operator works on a production transfer line which operates between two 
tanks.  His role is to ensure the correct product is selected for transfer from one tanker to 
the other; this can be done by operation of the relevant valves which are located remotely.  
The essential valves must be opened to allow the task to be carried out.   The operator 
possesses average experience in fulfilling this role.  The individual is situated in a control 
room which has a relatively noisy environment and poor lighting.  There is a time 
window of 5 minutes to carry out the required task.  
Method.  The figures for the HEP calculation, obtained from the relevant tables, are given 
as follows:  
• The type of task to be executed: K1 = 0.01 
• Time available to complete the task: K2 = 0.5 
• Level of experience: K3 = 1 
• Operator’s state of mind: K4 = 1 
• Environmental and ergonomic conditions: K5 = 10 
The calculation for the final HEP figure is therefore calculated as: 
   K1 × K2  ×  K3 ×  K4 × K5
   =  0.01 × 0.5 × 1 × 1 × 10 
    = 0.05 
Result.  Given the result of this calculation, it can be deduced that were the control room 
notified of the valves’ positions and if the microclimate was better, K5 would be unity, 
and therefore the HEP would be 0.005, representing an improvement of 1 order of 
magnitude.   
Advantages of TESEO 
• The technique of TESEO is typically quick and straightforward in comparison to other 
HRA tools, not only in producing a final result, but also in sensitivity analysis e.g. it 
is useful in identifying the effects improvements in human factors will have on the 
overall human reliability of a task.  It is widely applicable to various control room 
designs or with procedures with varying characteristics [87].   
Disadvantages of TESEO 
• There is limited work published with regards to the theoretical foundations of this 
technique, in particular relating to the justification of the five factor methodology 
[87]. Regardless of the situation, it remains to be assumed that these 5 factors are 
suffice for an accurate assessment of human performance; as no other factors are 
considered, this suggests that to solely use these 5 factors to adequately describe the 
full range of error producing conditions fails to be highly realistic.  Further to this, the 
values of K1-5 are unsubstantiated and the suggested multiplicative relationship has no 
sufficient theoretical or empirical evidence for justification purposes. 
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Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction (THERP) 
Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction (THERP) is a technique used in the field of 
HRA for the purposes of evaluating the probability of a human error occurring throughout 
the completion of a specific task.  From such analyses measures can then be taken to 
reduce the likelihood of errors occurring within a system and therefore lead to an 
improvement in the overall levels of safety.  There exist three primary reasons for 
conducting an HRA; error identification, error quantification and error reduction.  HRA 
techniques have been utilised in a range of industries including healthcare, engineering, 
nuclear, transportation and business sector; each technique has varying uses within 
different disciplines. 
THERP models HEPs using an event-tree approach in a similar way to an engineering risk 
assessment, but also accounts for PSFs that may influence these probabilities. The 
probabilities for the human reliability analysis event tree (HRAET), which is the primary 
tool for assessment, are calculated from the database developed by the authors Swain and 
Guttman [107].  The resultant tree portrays a step by step account of the stages involved 
in a task, in a logical order. The technique is known as a total methodology as it 
simultaneously manages a number of different activities including task analysis, error 
identification, represented in form of HRAET and HEP quantification.  
Background 
The Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction (THERP) is a first generation 
methodology which means that its procedures follow the way conventional reliability 
analysis models a machine [26]. The technique was developed in the Sandia Laboratories 
for the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission  [107].  Its primary author is Swain, who 
developed the THERP methodology gradually over a lengthy period of time [91].   THERP 
relies on a large human reliability database containing HEPs which is based upon both 
plant data and expert judgements.  The technique was the first approach in HRA to come 
into broad use and is still widely used in a range of applications even beyond its original 
nuclear setting.    
THERP Methodology 
The methodology for the THERP technique is broken down into 5 main stages: 
1. Define the system failures of interest 
These failures include functions of the system in which human error has a greater 
likelihood of influencing the probability of a fault, and those which are of interest to 
the risk assessor; operations in which there may be no interest include those which are 
not operationally critical or those for which there already exist safety counter 
measures.   
2. List and analyse the related human operations, and identify human errors that can 
occur and relevant human error recovery modes 
This stage of the process necessitates a comprehensive task and human error analysis. 
The task analysis lists and sequences the discrete elements and information required 
by task operators. For each step of the task, possible occurring errors which may 
transpire are considered by the analyst and precisely defined.   The possible errors are 
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then considered by the analyst, for each task step.  The opportunity for error recovery 
must also be considered as this, if achieved, has the potential to reduce drastically 
error probability for a task.   
The tasks and associated outcomes are input to an HRAET in order to provide a 
graphical representation of a task’s procedure. The trees’ compatibility with 
conventional event-tree methodology i.e. including binary decision points at the end 
of each node, allows it to be evaluated mathematically.   
An event tree visually displays all events which occur within a system.  It starts off 
with what is known as an initiating event, and then branches are developed as various 
intermediate events are added.  The event tree thus shows a number of different paths 
each of which has an associated end state or consequence.   
3. Assess the relevant error probabilities 
HEPs for each sub-task are entered into the tree; it is necessary for all failure branches 
to have a probability otherwise the system will fail to provide a final answer.  HRAETs 
provide the function of breaking down the primary operator tasks into finer steps 
which are represented in the form of successes and failures. This tree indicates the 
order in which the events occur and also considers likely failures that may occur at 
each of the represented branches.  The degree to which each high level task is broken 
down into lower level tasks is dependent on the availability of HEPs for the successive 
individual branches.   The HEPs may be derived from a range of sources such as: the 
THERP database; simulation data; historical accident data; expert judgement. PSFs 
should be incorporated into these HEP calculations; the primary source of guidance for 
this is the THERP handbook.  However the analyst must use their own discretion when 
deciding the extent to which each of the factors applies to the task 
4. Estimate the effects of human error on the system failure events 
With the completion of the HRA the human contribution to failure can then be 
assessed in comparison with the results of the overall reliability analysis.  This can be 
completed by inserting the HEPs into the full system’s fault event tree which allows 
human factors to be considered within the context of the full system.   
5. Recommend changes to the system and recalculate the system failure probabilities 
Once the human factor contribution is known, sensitivity analysis can be used to 
identify how certain risks may be improved in the reduction of HEPs.  Error recovery 
paths may be incorporated into the event tree as this will aid the assessor when 
considering the possible approaches by which the identified errors can be reduced. 
Worked Example 
Context.  The following example illustrates how the THERP methodology can be used in 
practice in the calculation of HEPs.  It is used to determine the HEP for establishing air 
based ventilation using emergency purge ventilation equipment on In-Tank Precipitation 
(ITP) processing tanks 48 and 49 after failure of the nitrogen purge system following a 
seismic event. 
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Assumptions.  In order for the final HEP calculation to be valid, the following 
assumptions are required: 
1. There exists a seismic event initiator which leads to the establishment of air based 
ventilation on the ITP processing tanks 48 and 49  
2. It is assumed that both on and offsite power is unavailable within the context and 
therefore control actions which are performed by the operator are done so locally, on 
the tank top 
3. The time available for operations personnel to establish air based ventilation by use of 
the emergency purge ventilation, following the occurrence of the seismic event, is a 
duration of 3 days  
4. There is a necessity for an ITP equipment status monitoring procedure to be developed 
to allow for a consistent method to be adopted for the purposes of evaluating the ITP 
equipment and component status and selected process parameters for the period of an 
accident condition 
5. Assumed response times exist for initial diagnosis of the event and for the placement 
of emergency purge ventilation equipment on the tank top.  The former is 10 hours 
while the latter is 4 hours. 
6. The In-Tank Precipitation Process has associated Operational Safety Requirements 
(OSR) which will identify the precise conditions under which the emergency purge 
ventilation equipment should be hooked up to the riser 
7. The “Tank 48 System” Standard Operating Procedure has certain conditions and 
actions which must be included for correct completion to be performed. 
8. A vital component of the emergency purge ventilation equipment unit is a flow 
indicator; this is required in the event of the emergency purge ventilation equipment 
being hooked up incorrectly as it would allow for a recovery action 
9. The personnel available to perform the necessary tasks all possess the required skills 
10. Throughout the installation of the emergency purge ventilation equipment, carried out 
by maintenance personnel, a tank operator must be present to monitor this process.  
Method.  An initial task analysis was carried out on the off normal procedure and 
standard operating procedure.  This allowed for the operator to align and then initiate the 
emergency purge ventilation equipment given the loss of the ventilation system. 
Thereafter, each individual task was analysed from which it was then possible to assign 
error probabilities and error factors to events which represented operator responses. 
• A number of the HEPs were adjusted to take account of various PSFs which had been 
identified 
• Upon assessment of characteristics of the task and behaviour of the crew, recovery 
probabilities were deciphered.  Such probabilities are influenced by such factors as  
task familiarity, alarms and independent checking 
• Once error probabilities were decided upon for the individual tasks, event trees were 
then constructed from which calculation formulations were derived.  The probability 
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of failure was obtained through the multiplication of each of the failure probabilities 
along the path under consideration.  
 
HRA event tree for align and start emergency purge ventilation equipment on In-Tank Precipitation Tank 
48 or 49 after a seismic event 
 
The summation of each of the failure path probabilities provided the total failure path 
probability (FT) 
Results.   
Task A: Diagnosis, HEP 6.0E-4 EF=30 
Task B: Visual Inspection performed shiftly, recovery factor HEP=0.001 EF=3 
Task C: Initiate standard operating procedure HEP= .003 EF=3 
Task D: Maintainer hook-up emergency purge ventilation equipment HEP=.003 EF=3 
Task E: Maintainer 2 hook-up emergency purge, recovery factor CHEP=0.5 EF=2 
Task G: Tank operator instructing /verifying hook-up, recovery factor CHEP=0.5 Lower 
bound = .015 Upper bound = 0.15 
Task H: Read Flow Indicator, Recovery Factor CHEP = .15 Lower bound = .04 Upper 
bound = .5 
Task I: Diagnosis HEP= 1.0E-5 EF=30 
Task J: Analyse LFL Using portable LFL Analyser, Recovery Factor CHEP= 0.5 Lower 
bound = .015 Upper bound =.15 
From the various figures and workings, it can be determined that the HEP for establishing 
air based ventilation using the emergency purge ventilation equipment on In-tank 
Precipitation processing tanks 48 and 49 after a failure of the nitrogen purge system 
following a seismic event is 4.2 E-6.  This numerical value is judged to be a median value 
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on the lognormal scale.  However, it should be noted that this result is only valid given 
that all the previously stated assumptions are implemented.   
Advantages of THERP 
• It is possible to use THERP at all stages of design.  Furthermore THERP is not restricted 
to the assessment of designs already in place and due to the level of detail in the 
analysis it can be specifically tailored to the requirements of a particular assessment 
[87].  
• THERP is compatible with PRA; the methodology of the technique means that it can be 
readily integrated with fault tree reliability methodologies [87].  
• The THERP process is transparent, structured and provides a logical review of the 
human factors considered in a risk assessment; this allows the results to be examined 
in a straightforward manner and assumptions to be challenged [87].  
• The technique can be utilised within a wide range of differing human reliability 
domains and has a high degree of face validity [87].  
• It is a unique methodology in the way that it highlights error recovery and it also 
quantitatively models a dependency relation between the various actions or errors. 
Disadvantages of THERP 
• THERP analysis is very resource intensive, and may require a large amount of effort to 
produce reliable HEP values.  This can be controlled by ensuring an accurate 
assessment of the level of work required in the analysis of each stage [87]. 
• The technique does not lend itself to system improvement.  Compared to some other 
HRA tools such as HEART, THERP is a relatively unsophisticated tool as the range of 
PSFs considered is generally low and the underlying psychological causes of errors 
are not identified.  
• With regards to the consistency of the technique, large discrepancies have been found 
in practice with regards to different analysts assessment of the risk associated with the 
same tasks.  Such discrepancies may have arisen from either the process mapping of 
the tasks in question or in the estimation of the HEPs associated with each of the tasks 
through the use of THERP tables compared to, for example, expert judgement or the 
application of PSFs [27, 83, 84]. 
• The methodology fails to provide guidance to the assessor in how to model the impact 
of PSFs and the influence of the situation on the errors being assessed. 
• The THERP HRAETs implicitly assume that each sub-task’s HEP is independent from 
all others i.e. the HRAET does not update itself in the event that an operator takes a 
sub-optimal route through the task path. This is reinforced by the HEP being merely 
reduced by the chance of recovery from a mistake, rather than by introducing 
alternative (i.e. sub-optimal) “success” routes into the event-tree, which could allow 
for Bayesian updating of subsequent HEPs. 
• THERP is a “first generation” HRA tool, and in common with other such tools has been 
criticised for not taking adequate account of context [26]. 
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